



JPRS Report—

Arms Control

Arms Control

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Foreign Minister on U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement

OW1806155692 Beijing XINHUA in English
1530 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Excerpts] Canberra, June 18 (XINHUA)—The further development in the Sino-Australian relations will not only benefit both sides but also be helpful to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said here today.

The visiting foreign minister said at a press conference this afternoon that his visit has been smooth and both sides have expressed satisfaction with the development of the bilateral relations since its establishment 20 years ago.

Both sides hold similar or identical views on many issues, Qian said, and the respective positions on some issues are not mutually exclusive.

Qian arrived here last night for a 4-day visit, after he wound up a visit to New Zealand. He held talks with Australian Governor-General William George Hayden and his Australian counterpart Gareth Evans respectively this morning. [passage omitted]

As for the recent Russian-U.S. agreement on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, Qian said that China welcomes the move and expects a further reduction.

Despite the cuts, Qian said, the two countries will still maintain 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear war-heads respectively in line with the agreement and it is still a huge number.

Reportage on U.S.-Russian Summit Meeting

Strategic Arms Agreement Said 'Most Important'

OW1806050692 Beijing XINHUA in English
0453 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Excerpt] Washington, June 17 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin wound up their two-day summit here today by signing seven agreements ranging from deep cuts in strategic arms to double taxation avoidance.

"During these two days we embarked on a new partnership," Bush said at a joint press conference following the signing ceremony.

Yeltsin declared that "we now have a basis for interaction. We now have something that we can fill with substantive content."

The most important agreement they signed was the joint understanding on reductions in strategic offensive arms which will slash their nuclear stockpiles by two thirds.

Under the agreement, the United States and Russia will reduce the warheads of their strategic arms to no more than 3,500 each, eliminate land-based long-range nuclear

missiles with multiple warheads and cap the warheads of their submarine-launched missiles at 1,750 each, all by the year 2003.

Currently, the United States and Russia have approximately 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads each and the land-based long-range nuclear missiles are the backbone of Russia's strategic force.

When asked whether steep reduction means more peace dividend for the United States, Bush said that "the dividend is declared when you make a profit, and our government is operating under an enormous deficit...and so I would not pledge that any savings that might accrue to us because of this far-reaching agreement would go to some federal spending project."

Bush also skirted a question about how the United States would respond to Yeltsin's announcement that Russia has begun taken off alert the SS-18 heavy long-range missiles targeted at the United States, although the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is not in effect.

"We will live up to the agreement we entered into, and I'm not prepared to say what we will do in regards to the question of defusing or targeting," Bush said. [passage omitted]

'Analysis' of Arms Agreement

OW1806014292 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1629 GMT 17 Jun 92

[("News analysis" by reporter Huang Yong (7806 3144))

[Text] Washington, 16 Jun (XINHUA)—U.S. President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin announced on 16 June that the two countries had reached an agreement on further reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

It was reported that the two sides agreed to reduce their respective strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 no later than the year 2003 and to destroy all their land-based multiwarhead ICBM's within the next 7-10 years. They also agreed to reduce their respective sea-based ICBM warheads to 1,750.

Not long after the Soviet Union disintegrated, President Bush proposed to Russia that both nations further reduce their nuclear weapons based on the framework of the U.S.-Soviet strategic weapons agreement signed last year. The core of Bush's proposal is that the two sides destroy all their land-based multiwarhead ICBM's. Yeltsin later offered a "counter proposal," urging both sides to drastically reduce strategic weapons of all kinds.

The agreement reached on 16 June indicates that the concession made by Russia—which is obliged to destroy its land-based multiwarhead ICBM's, including all its SS-18 missiles, which account for 60 percent of its nuclear arsenal—is apparently greater than that by the United States.

In the last few months, the United States and Russia have engaged in heated bargaining over the magnitude, category, and timetable for further reducing strategic weapons. Foreign ministers of the two countries continued their tense talks just before the summit meeting on the morning of 16 June. The media here hold that the two sides were able to reach an agreement because both sides have political and economic needs for it.

First, since the "cold war" ended, both the United States and Russia have deemed it necessary to slow down the pace of the nuclear arms race in order to reduce military spending and to use more financial and material resources to solve their economic problems.

Second, the new agreement on reducing strategic weapons will help reduce resistance to U.S. efforts to provide economic aid to Russia. Despite Russia's complaints about the U.S. attempt to seek a unilateral strategic advantage, it had to yield to U.S. pressure and had to make major concessions because of its serious economic difficulties and political turbulences and because of its urgent need for Western countries' aid.

Moreover, one of the U.S. purposes of suggesting further reducing strategic weapons was to weaken Russia's advantage in land-based missiles, especially to eliminate the threat to the United States posed by Russia's SS-18 missiles. However, the U.S. intention was so obvious that it aroused strong dissatisfaction in Russia, especially among the Russian military. The United States worried that if it insisted on its position, not only might it not fulfill its wishes but also its position might have adverse effects on Yeltsin's reform program. Therefore, the United States finally also made some concessions on

reducing its sea-based missiles in an attempt to win an agreement that is in its favor.

Furthermore, reaching an agreement on further reducing strategic weapons will help Bush and Yeltsin enhance their political status; it will especially help President Bush's reelection effort.

At today's joint press conference, both Bush and Yeltsin gave high marks to the agreement. Bush claimed that "the nuclear nightmare is diminishing." However, some arms control experts pointed out that the new strategic weapons agreement still allows each of the two countries to possess a fairly large nuclear arsenal and that these nuclear arsenals will remain a destabilizing factor in U.S.-Russian relations.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes U.S.-Russia Arms Treaty

*OW1806100892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0955 GMT 18 Jun 92*

[Text] Beijing, June 18 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman today welcomed the signing of a U.S.-Russian treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

"We welcome the signing of the treaty between Russia and the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons and we hope they will implement this treaty in real earnest," spokesman Wu Jianmin told a weekly press conference this afternoon.

Meanwhile, he said, "we also welcome the improvement of relations between the United States and Russia and hope this will be conducive to the safeguarding of world peace."

INDIA

Rao Urges Suspension of Nuclear Tests

*BK2306092092 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0830 GMT 23 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] The prime minister has called for India and Japan to speak with one voice to represent the conscience of humanity on nuclear nonproliferation. Mr. Narasimha Rao was speaking at a function at the Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo today to mark the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Japan. He said nuclear nonproliferation has always been one of India's central concerns. He called for a convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons, a verifiable freeze on the production of fissionable material for weapons, suspension of all nuclear weapon tests, and negotiations for general and complete disarmament. Focusing attention on the widening North-South divide, Mr. Narasimha Rao called for consensus in international relations and democratization of the United Nations. [passage omitted]

IRAN

Velayati Calls For Nuclear-Free Middle East In Geneva

LD1806111792 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0930 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Telephone report from Geneva by unidentified correspondent]

[Text] Heading a diplomatic delegation, Foreign Minister Velayati arrived in Geneva last night to participate in the UN Disarmament Conference.

In a speech at the Geneva disarmament session this morning, Mr. Velayati said: The biased behavior of the Security Council in crisis situations has severely undermined the credibility of that organization, so that governments can no longer rely on its decisions when their security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are threatened.

He added: The Security Council's two opposing positions on the acts of aggression against Iran and Kuwait are too obvious to ever be overlooked or forgotten. He called on the Disarmament Conference to strive for destroying nuclear weapons in countries that possess them by the year 2000. Similar undertakings should also be made by all countries not to obtain or proliferate nuclear weapons or to add them to their existing arsenals.

About controlling and destroying chemical weapons, he stated: We strive for the total destruction of chemical weapons. It is surprising that when our people were victims of such weapons very little international attention was given to this. Even under the worst conditions we refrained from obtaining such bestial weapons. Deadly weapons were used against us up to the final stages of the war.

He asked the Disarmament Conference, for the sake of attaining a Middle East free of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, to have all of Israel's nuclear facilities be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency and to have Israel join the biological weapons convention.

He called on the Disarmament Conference to make definite decisions about regulating the import and export of various weapons.

GENERAL**'Text' of Russo-American Friendship Treaty**

*LD1806090192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2310 GMT 17 Jun 92*

[Text] Washington, 18 June. (ITAR-TASS)—The full text of the Charter of Russo-American Partnership and Friendship signed by Presidents B. Yeltsin and G. Bush on 17 June follows below:

The Russian Federation and the United States of America, striving to provide a reliable and durable basis for Russo-American relations of partnership and friendship;

Thinking that the growth of the well-being, the flourishing and security of the democratic Russian Federation and the United States of America are vitally inter-linked;

Stating their resoluteness to adhere strictly to democratic principles and practices, including the supremacy of the law and respect of human rights and basic freedoms, including the rights of individuals belonging to minorities;

Recognizing the significance of the rights of the individual in the creation of a just and flourishing society;

Affirming their adherence to the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, the Helsinki Final Act, and the subsequent documents of the CSCE;

Wishing to build a democratic world that unites the whole community of democratic states;

Noting their particular responsibility as permanent members of the UN Security Council for upholding international peace and security;

Wishing to further the development of free market relations, economic revival and growth, and also close economic cooperation, commerce, and investment;

Have drawn up the following Charter of Russo-American Partnership and Friendship:

Democracy and Partnership

The Russian Federation and the United States of America affirm their adherence to the ideals of democracy, to the supremacy of the law and legality, to respect for human rights and basic freedoms. The United States of America fully supports the efforts of the Russian Federation to create a democratic state and society founded upon the supremacy of the law and respect for basic human rights. Proceeding from mutual trust and respect as the basis of mutual relations, they are developing relations of partnership and friendship.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America will cooperate closely on the international arena

in the interests of the advancement and the protection of common democratic values, human rights, and basic freedoms.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America intend to expand and step up multilateral dialogue on various levels both on bilateral and international problems.

Taking into account the most important significance of contacts between the president of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America for determining the fundamental directions of bilateral relations, and also in the context of global cooperation and stability, summits will be held on a regular basis.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America express their determination to further the strengthening of trust and the deepening of mutual understanding between their peoples. They proceed from the premise that the expansion of contacts between citizens will help to guarantee the irreversibility of the new quality of Russo-American relations.

To this end they intend to further the regulation of direct contacts between citizens and also between political, public, trade union, religious, and other organizations.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America are ready to further the work of their diplomats, journalists, businessmen, scientific personnel, and other citizens through reaching an agreement on opening up their territories for travel, lifting other restrictions on travel, and expanding consular institutions.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America devote particular attention to the development of the relevant contacts at all levels of state administration—federal, regional, and local—and also between representatives of the private sector and public organizations.

The United States of America intends to continue to cooperate with a view to strengthening democratic institutions and to constructing a law-governed state in the Russian Federation, including an independent legal system and the creation of a mechanism of guarantees of the observation of the rights of the individual.

International Peace and Security

The Russian Federation and the United States of America affirm their determination to build a democratic world, based upon the twin foundation of political and economic freedom. The Russian Federation and the United States of America recognize the critical significance of the success of democracy in Russia and other former Soviet republics for international peace and security.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America, on the basis of mutual trust, respect for and a common adherence to democracy and economic freedom, affirming the Camp David Declaration of

February 1992, the Paris Charter of November 1990, the communique of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council adopted in December 1991, March and June 1992, and also the communique of the conference of the Ministers of Defense of April 1992, once again state that they do not regard each other as adversaries and are developing relations of partnership and friendship.

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other treaty obligations, the Russian Federation and the United States of America affirm their obligations to resolve disputes between themselves by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat of force or its use against each other's territorial integrity and political independence.

Basing themselves on common democratic values, the Russian Federation and the United States of America will unite in their efforts with a view to strengthening international peace and security, to averting and settling regional conflicts, and also to deciding global problems.

Working in the interests of achieving a democratic world, the Russian Federation and the United States of America realize that the end of the "cold war" has not led to the cessation of instability and conflicts in Europe. Tension between the nationalities, territorial disputes, and international rivalry are already threatening to turn the nascent prospect of achieving peace into a new phase of shocks on the European continent.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America affirm their respect for the independence, sovereignty, and existing frontiers of the CSCE participant-states, including the new independent states, and recognize that changes in frontiers can only take place by peaceful means and on the basis of accord in line with the norms of international law and the principles of the CSCE.

Like other countries of the Euro-Atlantic community, the Russian Federation and the United States of America cannot agree with Europe entering a new period of instability. Therefore, they intend to propose support and their leading role in the efforts aimed at ridding this community of tragedies like those that have befallen Yugoslavia. It is clear what should be done: It is necessary to work out and to strengthen the international means of collective interaction with a view to promoting the prevention of conflicts by addressing the causes giving rise to them; with a view to promoting the settlement of disputes before they acquire a violent character; with a view to promoting mediation in putting an end to conflicts no matter where they arise; with a view to promoting the maintenance of peace immediately after it is established.

Therefore, the mechanisms for averting, controlling [kontrol], and settling conflicts should be strengthened, as should the possibilities for maintaining peace in Europe, if we want to cope with future crises in an

appropriate manner. To these ends, the Russian Federation and the United States of America support the following initiatives:

—The institution of the post of special CSCE envoy in order to help increase efforts to decide questions connected with interethnic tension and the attitude to minorities.

—The strengthening of resources within the CSCE framework aimed at guaranteeing the more effective prevention, control [kontrol], and settlement of international disputes.

—The creation of a sufficiently strong Euro-Atlantic peace-keeping potential, based on the political authority of the CSCE, which would allow the use of the possibilities of the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council], NATO, and the WEU to prepare, support, and manage operations under the aegis of the CSCE, and would also allow each of the participating states of the CSCE to allocate armed forces and resources.

Taking account of the indivisibility of the security of North America and Europe, the Russian Federation and the United States of America support the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic community, being convinced that security is indivisible from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The sides are united in their view of the Euro-Atlantic community as being open for cooperation with all democratic countries. The important role of such organizations as the NACC, NATO, and the WEU alongside the CSCE, especially promote Euro-Atlantic security. The potential is also noted of other institutions and mechanisms, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, in maintaining security and peace in this region.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America proceed from the fact that the strengthening of trust and stability in Asia and the Pacific region in cooperation with other states will also promote global security. The sides are ready to interact in reaching these goals. They are striving for a more complete utilization of the potential for trading and economic cooperation in this region of the world, particularly taking account of the geographical position of Russia and the United States.

Noting the advance in the settling of chronic conflicts, the promoting of democracy and human rights, and the strengthening of economic freedom and prosperity in the extensive regions of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the Russian Federation and the United States of America emphasize the need to continue this process. Both sides are ready to contribute to the utilization of the new potential for peace, to the ending of conflicts, to the strengthening of mutual trust, and to the deepening of democracy, which constitute the foundation for lasting peace in all regions of the planet.

With the aim of coordinating crisis prevention measures, the Russian Federation and United States of America

acknowledge the very great importance of maintaining open channels of communication and exchanges. The Russian Federation and United States of America acknowledge the importance of the UN Security Council and intend to maintain contacts with the other members of the Security Council with the aim of averting, monitoring, and settling crisis situations. The Russian Federation and United States of America acknowledge the important role of the United Nations Organization in dealing with major international problems. They welcome, in particular, the UN's contribution to peace and security, including the stepping up of the UN's peace-keeping functions.

The Russian Federation and United States of America are prepared to work together with the aim of ensuring further arms control and disarmament with the intention of promoting stability by means of implementing treaties, together with all the sides involved, on conventional armed forces in Europe and on strategic offensive weapons reductions and limitations, as well as through the enactment of corresponding unilateral response initiatives in the nuclear weapons field. The sides firmly intend to discuss further steps that could increase stability and lead to further nuclear and conventional weapons cuts, the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world, and the promotion of confidence-building crisis prevention measures.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America are ready to cooperate on issues concerning the elimination of nuclear warheads and chemical weapons that are subject to destruction under treaty commitments, as well as unilateral reciprocal initiatives.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America believe that the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial priority. The parties will work towards reinforcing and perfecting the systems of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, missiles and missile technology, as well as destabilizing conventional weapons, in accordance with international rules and accords.

In this connection, the Russian Federation and the United States of America have expressed in a separate statement their determination to cooperate in the study of the potential for setting up a center to provide early warning of ballistic missile launches, and also to cooperate in the development of systems and technologies for defense against ballistic missiles.

Taking into account the potential for developing a strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the parties intend to step up cooperation on defense matters between their military structures, including the following: to step up contacts on all levels; to broaden the range of measures encouraging openness in the sphere of doctrines and operational activity; to get expanded programs of exchange and communication established; and to

exchange ideas on the matter of developing appropriate interrelations between civic and military structures in a democratic society. The parties will also implement cooperation in measures to maintain peace and to fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

Economy

The Russian Federation and the United States of America proceed from the premise that Russia's most reliable path towards long-term prosperity and integration in the global economy lies through the continuation of the reforms being implemented today in the direction of the free market.

In order to achieve this goal, the Russian Federation intends to speed up the processes of privatization and demonopolization, the carrying out of structural and sector reforms, and also the development of a policy aimed at promoting competition and ensuring effective contractual property rights. The implementation of land reform will have particular significance as will the reforming of the power-engineering sector.

The United States of America, aware of the significance of these processes for the world economy as a whole and for the success of democracy, duly acknowledges the courage with which the Russian Government embarked on the path of reform and expresses its commitment to continuing support for the course of reform selected by the Russian Government on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through the "Group of Seven," international financial institutions, and the process of the coordinating conference to provide humanitarian and technological aid. The United States of America recognizes the very great importance that provision of technological aid according to principles of cooperation in the interests of support for the reforms can have, as well as the significance of continuing to expand its efforts in this field.

The Russian Federation and United States of America recognize the very important role the private sector must play in the economic rebirth of Russia and its integration into the global economy. The Russian Federation and United States of America intend to encourage mutually advantageous Russian-American cooperation in the area of trade, investment, aid to business, and science and technology.

The Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the creation of a favorable investment climate in Russia is absolutely essential. To this end, Russia intends, in accordance with its own constitutional procedures, to improve its legislation in the area of taxation, property and contract law, as well as in the area of intellectual property rights.

In the interests of promoting trade and investments, as well as of facilitating the activities of their businessmen on one another's territory, the Russian Federation and United States of America intend to lower the barriers to activity by their business circles and corporations on one

another's territory and lift restrictions on business activities, which date from the "Cold War."

The Russian Federation and United States of America take note of the importance they attach to the extensive involvement of the private sector in the interests of promoting economic reform and cooperation in all spheres, and in particular of its involvement in agriculture and the distribution of foodstuffs; in power engineering, including oil, gas, and the peaceful and safe use of nuclear power; in peaceful space research in accordance with international obligations; in telecommunications; in environmental protection; and the conversion of the defense sector.

The Russian Federation and United States of America are full of resolve to continue cooperation both on the bilateral level and within the framework of the appropriate multilateral mechanisms with the aim of increasing the efficiency and universal application of existing international export control regimes.

Desiring to expand the potential for trade and investment in the high technology sphere in Russia and other new independent states and being fully aware of their responsibility in so doing for establishing and maintaining strict control conditions with the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Russia and the United States of America intend to strive for these objectives on a bilateral basis and within the appropriate international forums, in particular through COCOM and the new COCOM cooperation forum.

The Russian Federation and United States of America confirm that they will encourage exchanges in the sphere of science, technology, education, and culture and in other spheres.

The Russian Federation and United States of America intend to accelerate their joint work to transfer the defense sectors to civilian output production.

Russian-Ukrainian Agreement On Strategic Forces, Lisbon, CFE

LD2306222792 Moscow IT4R-TASS World Service
in Russian 2110 GMT 23 Jun 92

[*"Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Further Development of Interstate Relations"*]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—The Russian Federation and Ukraine, while striving to strengthen friendly partnership ties based on universally accepted norms of international law and noting the contribution made by the peoples of Russia and Ukraine to the development of the democratic processes in both states and the responsibility for further deepening them, have agreed on the following:

1. The sides will build their relations as friendly states and immediately will start drawing up a new wide-scale

political treaty that will reflect the new qualities of the relations between them. Until such a treaty is concluded, the sides will unwaveringly observe the provisions of the 19 November 1990 treaty between the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the subsequent Ukrainian-Russian agreements.

2. Aware of the reality of the threat from the anti-democratic forces of both extreme left and extreme right persuasions, the sides state their resolve to undertake all necessary measures to defend the constitutional order and citizens' rights and liberties.

3. The sides will regularize their mutual payment obligations as of 1 July 1992 and will undertake coordinated actions to reorganize the payment settlement relations, including settling the accounting between economic subjects, taking into account the forthcoming introduction of the Ukrainian national currency.

4. The sides will proceed from world market prices in their mutual settlements for goods and services. For clearing the ensuing debts, the sides will grant each other long-term credits on favorable terms.

5. The sides are setting up an interstate bilateral commission for the regulation of trade and economic and cooperative relations, including relations between enterprises of the defense complex. They also are setting up a mixed group of experts to study and prepare proposals for settling questions on the procedures for redeeming securities issued by the government and central bodies of the former USSR.

6. The sides will undertake efforts to ensure the speediest ratification of an agreement on the procedure for settling disputes connected with the implementation of economic activity from 20 March 1992.

7. The sides will create a coordinated mechanism for handling the internal debt of the former USSR, which was formed as a result of the confiscation of the funds of enterprises and organizations by the Union government.

8. The sides reaffirm their adherence to the principle of the openness of the state borders between them. In this context they will determine the rules for customs control and a visa-free regime for the movement of the citizens of both states.

The sides will cooperate in putting a stop to smuggling and the illegal trade in drugs, weapons, and other illegal activities.

9. Noting that at present in the sphere of interethnic relations neither Russia nor Ukraine has grounds for alarm or mutual claims, they will conclude a corresponding agreement and take all other measures to protect the interests of people of Russian descent on the territory of Ukraine and of Ukrainian descent on the territory of Russia.

10. The sides will cooperate in overcoming and settling conflicts that might damage their security or in any other way substantially affect their interests.

11. The sides confirm their adherence to the existing agreements, which define the status of the strategic forces of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. They have agreed to continue the consultations with the aim of reaching accords on the implementation of the obligations entered into in accordance with the treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms of 31 July 1991, the Lisbon protocol of 23 May 1992, and agreements concluded earlier pertaining to strategic nuclear forces. The sides will take measures to ratify as quickly as possible the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe of 19 November 1990 and to implement it, and will cooperate in questions concerning the fulfillment of this international act.

12. The sides will continue the talks connected with the utilization of the means being made available by Germany to finance the withdrawal of the troops.

13. The sides have agreed on the transfer to Ukrainian ownership of a part of the former USSR's property abroad, through making individual buildings available in the near future to house diplomatic and consular missions and to enable their normal functioning. A joint commission of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian ministries of foreign affairs which will submit relevant proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation is being set up with this purpose in mind.

14. In connection with the creation of their own armed forces, the sides confirmed the importance of continuing talks to create a Russian Navy and a Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet. They agreed on a treaty basis to make use of the existing system of bases and material and technical supply. The sides agreed to refrain from unilateral actions before the conclusion of negotiations.

15. The servicemen of Russia and Ukraine called up to serve in units forming part of the conventional forces of the CIS will take their oath to the states of which they are citizens.

16. The sides will continue work to improve interparliamentary links and will step up the activity of the interparliamentary commission of Russia and Ukraine and bilateral cooperation between standing committees and commissions of the supreme soviets in the legislative sphere.

17. In order for Russian-Ukrainian relations to develop along the path of friendship, cooperation, and partnership, the sides agreed that summit meetings should be held on a regular basis. A negotiations mechanism will be created on the basis of state delegations to draft a full-scale political treaty and to prepare such meetings, as well as to coordinate actions to fulfill decisions adopted at the meetings.

18. The agreement comes into force from the day it is signed.

Drawn up in the town of Dagomys on 23 June 1992 in two genuine copies in Russian and Ukrainian, with both texts having equal force.

[Signed] President of Russia B. Yeltsin
President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk
R. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet
I. Plyushch, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
Ye. Gaydar, acting chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Government of Russia
V. Fokin, prime minister of Ukraine

START TALKS

Reports On Yeltsin Summit Talks in Washington

Yeltsin on Details of Arms Cuts

LD1706075392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0737 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Washington June 17 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin made the following remarks at a news conference in the White House Rose Garden on Tuesday [16 June]: "Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen.

I would like to add a few words to what President Bush has just announced here. What we have achieved is an unparalleled and probably an unexpected thing for you and for the whole world. You are the first to hear about this historic decision which has been reached today after just five months of negotiations. We are, in fact, (meeting) sharp dramatic reductions in the total number for the two sides of the number of the amount of nuclear warheads, from 21,000 to 6-7,000 for the United States of America and Russia.

Indeed, we have been able to cut over those five months of negotiations the total number of nuclear warheads to one-third, while it took 15 years under the START treaty to make some reductions. This is an expression of the fundamental change in the political and economic relations between the United States of America and Russia. It is also an expression and a proof of the personal trust and confidence that have been established between the presidents of these countries, President Bush of the United States of America and the president of Russia. And these things have been achieved without deception, without anybody wishing to gain unilateral advantages.

This is a result of the trust entertained by the president of the democratic Russia towards America and by the President of America towards the new Russia. This is the result of a carefully measured balance of security. We were not going in for numbers, for just one, two, three thousands of pieces. Rather, we have established a bracket for each country to elect the number, the figure that it will consider appropriate for its own defense and security.

As I have told you, the total number will go down from 21,000 to 6,000 for two sides. Under the first phase, the reductions for the two sides will be down to 3,800 to 4,250 bracket, including ICBMs, 1,250, and heavy missiles, 650, SLBMs, 2250. Under the second phase, we shall go down to, respectively, 3,000 and 3500, including total reduction and destruction of heavy missiles. Land-based MIRVs will be reduced as well. SLBMs will go down to 1,750. Each country will elect a figure that it will consider appropriate to ensure its defence and security.

Thus we are departing from the ominous parity where each country was exerting every effort to stay in line, which has led—Russia, for instance—having half of its population living below the poverty line. We cannot afford it, and therefore, we must have minimum security level to deal with any possible eventuality which might arise anywhere in the world and threaten our security. But we know one thing we shall not fight against each other.

This is a solemn undertaking that we are taking today, and it will be reflected as a matter of partnership and friendship in the charter that we are going to sign. Our proposal is to cut the process of destruction from the proposed. 13 years down to 9 years, so the things that I have been mentioning before will be materialized by the year 2000. [sentence as received] I am happy to be involved here in this historic occasion, and I will also hope that I will be as happy when this thing is materialized and President Bush and I will be celebrating together the implementation of that agreement in the year 2000. I thank you."

Then the presidents of the U.S. and Russia answered journalists' questions.

Yeltsin, Bush Field Questions

*LD1706100792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0904 GMT 17 Jun 92*

[Text] Washington June 17 TASS—Following an announcement of far-reaching reductions in nuclear arms at a news conference in the White House Rose Garden on Tuesday [16 June], President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin answered journalists' questions.

Question: Mr. President, would you explain for people who might not understand why friends who trust each other and are not planning to attack would still leave 7,000 nuclear warheads?

Bush: What I'm saying is we've moved dramatically down from 13,000. This will be seen as an enormous move forward towards the relaxation of tension and towards the friendship that we feel for each other. The elimination of these, the most destabilizing of weapons, is extraordinarily positive. And the fact that each country at this juncture in history retains some nuclear weapons speaks for itself.

Who knows what lies out there ahead? But certainly I agree with what President Yeltsin said, that there is no animosity, the Cold War days are over, and he came here in a spirit of forward movement on these arms control agreements, and that speaks for itself.

President Yeltsin: I would like to amplify on that. I would say that in response to your question, that the technical and financial resources that are required in order to destroy, dismantle and reduce the total number of warheads and missiles—from 21,000 to 6,000, 7,000 are enormous, and this is the only thing that conditions this figure.

President Bush: Let me—with your permission, Mr President, I would like to take the last question, which relates to the POW-MIA discussions that we have had. President Yeltsin and I discussed this morning that issue that is of the highest priority for our administration and, I know, for every American, the fate of American POWs and MIAs from World War II, Korea, the Cold War period, and Vietnam. President Yeltsin informed not for the first time that Russia may have information about the fate of some of our servicemen from Vietnam, and he said the Russian Government is pursuing this information vigorously just as we speak.

And with us today are President Yeltsin's adviser, Dmitriy Volkogonov over here—Dmitriy—and our able former ambassador to the USSR, Ambassador Malcolm Toon. Now, they are the cochairs of the joint U.S.-Russian commission on POW-MIAs, and they've met during the last few months, along with the members of the United States Congress who are also part of this bipartisan U.S. delegation, to unearth information on American POWs and MIAs from 1945 on, and Russian POW and MIAs from the Afghan war.

President Yeltsin and I have instructed both of these gentlemen to begin immediately a joint U.S.-Russian pursuit of the latest information that was given to me today. I have asked Ambassador Toon to return immediately to Moscow to work on this issue.

And I want to assure all Americans, and particularly those families of the American POWs and MIAs, that we will spare no effort in working with our Russian colleagues to investigate all information in the Russian archives concerning our servicemen. While we do not have any specific information to make public today, I pledge to keep the American people informed of developments on this issue and we—as we find out more about these latest leads.

And let me just point out that the forthcoming comments by President Yeltsin were just one more sign of this improved new relationship between Russia and the United States of America. For him to go back and dig into these records without fear of embarrassment is of enormous consequence to the people of the United States of America. And I salute him for this. He has told me that he will go the last mile to find whatever exists about our—a possibility of American POWs and MIAs

and to clear this record once and for all. And in so many other fields, this demonstrates his leadership and the period of change that we are saluting and that I saluted here today on the south lawn of the White House.

So we're very grateful to you, Mr. President.

President Yeltsin: I will only add a couple of points, Mr. President. Our commission, headed and chaired by Dmitriy Volkogonov, has been meeting for several months now and it has already met with some success. And I can promise that the joint commission, which will be established following this press conference, will be working hard and will report to the American public all the information that will be found in the archives that we are going to open for it, including the archives in the KGB, in the Central Committee of the Communist Party regarding the fate of American POWs and MIAs.

Question: Do you agree it's possible that some of those Americans may still be alive?

President Bush: I would simply say that this—I have no evidence of that, but that the cooperation that is—has been extended and, again, is being extended by the president of Russia will guarantee to the American people that if anyone's alive, that person—those people would be found. And equally as important to the loved ones is the accounting for any possible MIA. And so we have no evidence of anyone being alive, but I would simply say again that this is the best way to get to the bottom of it, and this new approach by the president of Russia, to go into their archives and to try to find missing records, will be the assurance that I can give the American people that the truth will be reached finally.

Question: Is there a danger of raising false expectations, Mr. President?

President Bush: You've got to be careful of that, yeah.

In conclusion the presidents of Russia and the U.S. thanked the U.S. secretary of state, the Russian foreign minister, as well as the defence ministers of the two countries for the large amount of work done by them during the talks.

Figures on Arms Cuts

LD1706051192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0448 GMT 17 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin: all figures as received]

[Text] Washington June 17 TASS—U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, at their talks in Washington on Tuesday [16 June], reached a historic agreement on new deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two sides. This was announced by the two leaders in their remarks at a brief news conference in the rose garden of the White House.

The aggregate number of warheads in the arsenals of Moscow and Washington will be reduced from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000.

The accords as presented by the two presidents look as follows:

- The United States and Russia reduce the number of warheads in their nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 for each side within the period ending in the year 2003 or 2000, with each nation determining its own force structure within that range.
- Under the first phase, the reductions for the two sides will go down to 3,800-4,250 bracket, including ICBM's, 1,250, and heavy missiles, 650, SLBM's, 2,250.
- Under the second phase there will be a 3,000-3,500 bracket for warheads for each side, including total reduction and destruction of heavy missiles. Land-based MIRVs will be reduced as well. SLBMs will go down to 1,750.

President Bush said the agreed upon reductions may be completed no later than the year 2003 and may be completed as early as the year 2000 "if the United States can assist Russia" in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems.

In the near future, the United States and Russia will record this accord in a brief treaty document that the two presidents will sign and submit for consideration and ratification to the legislatures of the two countries.

The Russian president, in an evaluation of the new nature of relationships between Moscow and Washington, defined them in his remarks in the White House as follows: "We shall not fight against each other. We are taking the road of partnership and friendship, and these relations will be sealed in a special charter."

A Washington charter is expected to be signed in the White House on Wednesday [17 June].

Spokesman Details Talks

LD1706160792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1507 GMT 17 Jun 92

[By Pavel Anichkin and Andrey Sitov, ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[Text] Washington June 17 TASS—Russia has already set about specific steps in preparation for the elimination of strategic missiles and warheads, Vyacheslav Kostikov, press secretary of the president of Russia, has told journalists at a briefing here.

In view of an accord reached during the current Russian-U.S. summit on far-reaching reductions in strategic offensive arms, Kostikov said the weapons would be eliminated in three places—Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70 and Sverdlovsk-45. 18 heavy missiles are already

being removed in Russia from operational alert as a gesture of goodwill, he added.

The Russian and U.S. presidents, during closed-door talks in the White House, discussed issues concerning not only nuclear arms but other weapons as well, Kostikov said.

Bush said in particular that the United States was very close to signing a convention on chemical weapons. Yeltsin said Russia was ready to sign such a document by autumn this year.

Matters related to reforms in Russia figured prominently at the talks. The U.S. President assured that he was ardently supporting the reform process. "There is full understanding among the U.S. Government that Russia's success in the transition to a market is America's success as well," Kostikov pointed out.

President Bush, he added, promised to use all his influence to urge the International Monetary Fund management to find a right, reasonable and compromise solution with regard to Russia and not set too tough conditions for the granting of credits to it.

The two presidents discussed space cooperation matters, Kostikov said. They spoke of the possibility of the launches of joint satellites, the utilization of the Soyuz space rocket to rescue American astronauts, a joint flight with the use of the Mir orbital station in 1993 as well as a docking of the Mir station and a U.S. space shuttle in 1994. They mentioned the possibility of a joint flight to Mars as a distant prospect.

Yeltsin told Bush that the Germans had submerged containers with a huge amount of chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea after the Second World War. The serviceability of the containers is drawing to an end. The containers are completely rusted and an ecological disaster in the Baltic Sea could be expected in the coming one or two years if no prompt measures are taken.

The two presidents also discussed the question of U.S. prisoners-of-war in Russia, Kostikov said. They meant a group of more than 2,000 POWs with a lot of different people among them—Americans who got to Russia after the Second World War, after the war in Vietnam, Americans with Russian names who at one time had been mistaken for the soldiers of General Vlasov's army siding with Nazi Germany. Several burial sites of Americans have already been found. The search is being continued.

In response, the U.S. President told Yeltsin that he would do his best to help Russia repatriate its prisoners-of-war from Afghanistan, Kostikov said.

Specifics of Reductions Reported

LD1806135792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0842 GMT 18 Jun 92

[Text] [no dateline as received] The president of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States agreed on further substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Specifically, the sides agreed to conclude a treaty very soon that will contain the following articles:

1. Within the seven-year period that follows the coming into force of the START Treaty, they will reduce their strategic forces to levels not exceeding:
 - a) a total number of warheads for each of the sides at between 3,800 and 4,250 (as each side shall determine for itself) or whatever lower level each side shall set for itself;
 - b) 1,200 warheads on MIRVed ICBMs;
 - c) 650 warheads on heavy ICBMs;
 - d) 2,160 warheads on SLBMs.
2. By 2003 (or, if the United States can contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive weapons in Russia, by the end of the year 2000) they will:
 - a) reduce the total number of each side's warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 (as each side shall determine for itself) or to such lower levels as are set by each side;
 - b) eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs;
 - c) reduce the number of warheads on SLBMs to a level not in excess of 1,750 warheads.
3. In order to calculate the numbers indicated above:
 - a) the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers intended for nuclear tasks will be the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped;
 - b) in observing the agreed procedures, heavy bombers, not exceeding 100 in number, which have never been equipped with ALCMs and which have been redesignated for non-nuclear tasks, will not be included in the overall levels stipulated by the present accord.
 - (1) Such heavy bombers will be based separately from heavy bombers intended for nuclear tasks.
 - (2) No nuclear weapons will be sited at the bases of heavy bombers intended for non-nuclear tasks.
 - (3) Such aircraft and crews will not take part in exercises or undergo training for tasks that use nuclear weapons.
 - (4) Existing inspection procedures that have already been agreed to under the START Treaty will be used to confirm that these bombers are intended for non-nuclear tasks. No new verification procedures will be required.

(5) If no other agreement is reached, these bombers will, as before, be covered by articles in the START Treaty, including the articles on inspections.

4. The reductions established in this accord will be carried out by destroying the launchers of missiles and heavy bombers by applying the procedures envisaged by the START Treaty and, in accordance with the plans of the two sides, by reducing the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles, excluding SS-18s. If no other agreement is reached, warheads on ballistic missiles will be counted in accordance with the counting regulations envisaged in the START Treaty.

5. The presidents gave instructions for the accord to be rapidly recorded as a short treaty-type document that they will sign and submit for ratification in their respective countries. Since this new accord is a separate document but serves to develop the START Treaty, they continue to make persistent calls for the START Treaty to be ratified and implemented as soon as possible.

Completed in Washington on 17 June 1992 in two copies, in Russia and in English, both texts are equally authoritative.

Cuts To Spark 'Fierce Debate'

PM1806093792 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
18 Jun 92 pp 1,3

[Report by correspondent Vladislav Drobkov: "Season of Visits. Yeltsin in America"]

[Excerpts] Washington, 17 Jun—Tuesday, 16 June, the second day of Boris Yeltsin's stay in America, saw the most important, most intensive, and busiest stage of his official U.S. visit. Perhaps even, the most contradictory.

History will reveal a pattern, but for the moment, to be frank, I do not know how to define what happened on this long, hot day: an historic breakthrough in the reduction of the two countries' nuclear arsenals, the beginning of a new era in their relationship, or a rash, unjustified concession to Washington and Russia's loss, once and for all, of its superpower status and importance. [passage omitted]

I do not know whether what happened a few hours after the meeting on the White House south lawn was the result of the grand reception, the outcome of the Americans' doggedness and diplomatic expertise, or a prearranged surprise, but, when they emerged to confront waiting journalists in the White House Rose Garden after the first round of talks, the two presidents announced that they had reached agreement on the chief and most difficult problem of the current visit. They announced that Russia and the United States had agreed to destroy all land-based multiple-warhead missiles and most of their remaining strategic nuclear missile arsenals. [passage omitted]

These sensational agreements caught many commentators unawares. Only the day before, the statement by

Bush and Yeltsin in the Rose Garden, U.S. Secretary of State Baker was talking about there still being serious differences between the sides' positions. The Russian president himself was saying that he would not make any concessions to the United States, which was seeking one-sided advantages. Then what happens? The advantages that accrue to Washington under the present accord are obvious. For all the benefits of the destruction of the cold war's nuclear legacy and the removal of the stockpiles of strategic missiles that are clogging up the world. I cannot understand why Russia should sacrifice the most powerful means of deterring a potential aggressor (not only the United States, given that our relationship has become such a remarkable one), and clearly this is going to give rise to fierce debate in the Russian Supreme Soviet when it comes to ratification of the agreements.

It appears that such an unexpected change in the Russian president's stance came as a surprise even to his press secretary, preventing him from coming up with a plausible explanation of what had happened. When V. Kosikov was asked why Yeltsin talked in Moscow about concessions being impossible, but then made them in Washington, he made the not entirely successful joke that the audience at home was a different one, a military audience.

However, there were people in Washington who appeared to know in advance how day one of the Bush-Yeltsin talks would end. They are the officials of the hyperconservative Heritage Foundation organization, which prepared for the Russian president's visit, a series of recommendations for the U.S. President. These recommendations were published in the previous issue of *PRAVDA*. Well, many of their pieces of advice have now come to pass. For instance, the Heritage Foundation recommended getting Yeltsin to accelerate the arms reduction process. Done! It suggested that he should be persuaded that the 1972 ABM Treaty must be abandoned. OK, a group of specialists has been set up to prepare for this. Exert pressure to get Russia's secret archives open? That has been done too—an exhibition of documents from CPSU Central Committee and KGB archives has opened in Washington.... [passage omitted]

Cuts Not To 'Weaken' Defense Capability

OW1806131792 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1250 GMT 18 Jun 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature based on reports by "diplomatic correspondents Igor Porshnev et al"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The unprecedented reduction of strategic nuclear armaments agreed upon in Washington by the presidents of Russia and the United States does not weaken the Russian defence capability in any way. The statement was made by a leading foreign ministry expert on disarmament.

In an exclusive interview for IF [INTERFAX] he said that even after the cuts Russia and the USA will keep "a

fantastic amount of nuclear charges". "In the past we used to speak of scores of thousands of charges. But even the 3,000-3,500 warheads which each of the sides can keep, it is too much", the expert stressed.

On the geography of the coming cuts the expert said that undoubtedly the strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan will be scrapped first. He emphasized that in Lisbon the three former Soviet republics signed a protocol under which their territories should become nuclear-free zones. According to the official, the cuts will also affect strategic weapons in Russia. Only in this case it is possible to reach the ceilings agreed upon in Washington, he added.

According to the expert, the framework understanding on the reduction of strategic nuclear armaments from the combined total of 21,000 warheads to 6,000 or 7,000 at the most is a compromise. During the talks before the Washington meeting the Americans insisted on cutting the land component of the Russian nuclear triad: heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Russia was ready for that only if the sea component of the American triad was reduced. In the final account the Americans agreed which permitted the two presidents to reach the understanding. Besides, the Washington agreement actually removes the asymmetry that appeared as a result of the START-1 treaty under which with the ceiling of 6,000 warheads the Americans could actually have 9,500 while the Soviet side only 7,000.

Signed Summit Documents Described

LD1706230992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2124 GMT 17 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Vladimir Matyash and Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Washington, 18 Jun—On the afternoon of 17 June, a ceremony to sign Russian-American documents took place in the White House. Boris Yeltsin and George Bush signed a charter of Russian-American partnership and friendship, a framework agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on further reductions in strategic offensive weapons, a memorandum on Russian-American cooperation on a global system for the defense of the international community, an agreement on cooperation in studying and using space for peaceful goals, an agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the safe and reliable transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and the prevention of arms proliferation, a treaty on encouraging mutual protection of capital investments, and a treaty on avoiding double taxation.

The Presidents issued joint statements on prospects for bilateral cooperation in studying and using space, on cooperation in the field of conversion, on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula, on the elimination of chemical weapons, on issues of bilateral relations, and a statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the Russian Government's behalf Yegor Gaidar signed an agreement on U.S. Peace Corps activity in Russia and an agreement between the Russian and U.S. governments on scientific and technical cooperation in the sphere of fuel and power engineering. Andrei Kozyrev, Russian minister of foreign affairs, and James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, put their signatures on a package of important bilateral documents, including memoranda on understanding between the Russian and U.S. governments regarding "open land" [otkrytaia susha] and on the use of air space, and an accord between the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy and the U.S. Defense Department regarding the safe and reliable transportation and storage of nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation and the United States, the Charter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendship says in particular, will closely interact in the international arena in the interests of advancing and defending common democratic values, human rights and the main liberties.

Considering the key importance of contacts between the president of the Russian Federation and the U.S. President for determining the basic areas of bilateral relations and also in the context of global cooperation and stability, summit meetings will be held on a regular basis.

While working in the interests of achieving a democratic world the Russian Federation and the United States realize that the ending of the cold war has not led to a halt of instability and conflicts in Europe. Inter-ethnic tension, territorial disputes, and international rivalry are already threatening to transform the prospects that have opened up for attaining peace into a fresh phase of upheavals in the European continent. Therefore, mechanisms to prevent, control, and settle conflicts and opportunities to keep peace in Europe must be strengthened, if we want to cope properly with future crises. To these ends, the Russian Federation and the United States support the following initiatives: The establishment of the post of special representative of the CSCE, to help increase efforts to solve problems connected with inter-ethnic tensions and attitudes to minorities; the strengthening of resources within the CSCE aimed at ensuring more effective prevention, control and settlement of international disputes; the creation of a sufficiently strong Euro-Atlantic peace-keeping potential, based on the political authority of the United Nations, which would make it possible to use the possibilities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO and the WEU to prepare, support and direct operations under the auspices of the CSCE, and would enable each member state of the CSCE to allocate armed forces and resources.

The Russian and the U.S. Presidents agreed on further important reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In particular the framework agreement on this issue notes that, during the seven years after the Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaty comes into force, they will cut their strategic forces to a level not above: A total level of

weapons for each of the sides of between 3,800 and 4,250; 1,200 MIRVed ICBM's, 650 heavy ICBM's, 2,160 SLBM's. By the year 2003 (or by the end of the year 2000, if the United States is able to make a contribution to the financing of the destruction or liquidation of strategic offensive weapons in Russia) the Russian Federation and the United States will cut the total number of weapons of each of the sides to between 3,000 and 3,500 (as each side will determine for itself) or to lower levels which each of the sides will determine: all MIRVed ICBM's are to be liquidated, the number of SLBM's is to be reduced to a level of not above 1,750.

The two Presidents agreed that their two countries should work together with their allies and other interested states to draw up the concept for a global defense system against ballistic missiles as part of a common strategy toward the dissemination of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They also agreed to set up a high-level group to study on a priority basis, practical steps such as the potential for exchanging information in the early warning sphere and the potential for cooperation with participating states in the development of the means and the technology for defense against ballistic missiles.

The Presidents emphasized their support for the destruction of chemical weapons at a global level. They expressed their conviction that the Geneva negotiations on a multilateral convention to ban chemical weapons could be concluded by the end of August.

During the period of the cold war, the statement on questions of bilateral relations notes, the USSR and the United States created a whole range of obstacles for each other's official representatives, insofar as their carrying out of their functions and travelling around the country they were staying in were concerned. As Russia and the United States enter a new era of partnership and cooperation, these old barriers are turning into an anachronism. In this connection an accord has been reached in Washington to eliminate "closed areas" and to switch to a concept of "open land" as a basis for working out conditions for the travel of officials. George Bush and Boris Yeltsin assessed the signing of the documents as an event of enormous importance—not only for Russia and the United States, the Russian and American peoples, but also for the whole world in general.

Yeltsin Addresses U.S. Congress

LD1706171592 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1509 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Speech by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in Washington, D.C.—live]

[Excerpts] [Lengthy applause] Please do not count the applause against the time of my speech! [laughter]

Esteemed Mr. Speaker of the House of Representatives, esteemed Mr. President of the Senate, esteemed members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen: It is a great

honor for me as the first ever popularly elected president in the 1,000 years of Russian history and as a citizen of a great power that has made its choice in favor of liberty and democracy, to speak here at the Congress of a great free land.

For many long years our nations were two poles, two extreme opposites. They wanted to make us implacable enemies, and this affected the destiny of mankind in a most tragic way. The world was shaken by the storms of confrontation. It was close to exploding—to dying beyond resurrection.

Now this devilish scenario is becoming a thing of the past. Reason is triumphing in the fight against madness. The period when America and Russia looked at each other through gunsights, ready to pull the trigger at any time, has ended.

Recalling the well-known American film "The Day After," it can be said today that tomorrow will be a day of peace—a day less of fear and more of hope for the happiness of our children. The world can sigh in relief. The idol of communism that spread social strife, animosity, and unparalleled brutality everywhere on earth, which instilled fear in human society, has collapsed. It has collapsed forever. I am here to assure you we will not let it rise again in our land. [passage omitted]

Russia has seen for itself that any delay in strengthening freedom and democracy can throw society back. For us, the ominous lessons of the past are relevant today as never before. It was precisely in a devastated country, with an economy that had been bled to death, that Bolshevism succeeded in building a totalitarian regime, creating a gigantic war machine, and launching an insatiable military-industrial complex. This must not be allowed to happen again. That is why economic and political reforms are the primary task for Russia today. [passage omitted]

Yesterday an unprecedented agreement was achieved on making deep reductions, in two stages, in strategic offensive armaments. They will be reduced not by 30 or 40 percent as was the case before, and that took 15 years to negotiate. They will be reduced to less than one-third of today's strength from 21,000 warheads to between 6,000 and 7,000. It has taken us only five months to negotiate this. All of the work will be carried out by the year 2000. I greatly hope that Bush and myself will still be alive then.

We simply have no right to bury this unique opportunity. The more so since today the fate of nuclear weapons and of the Russian reforms designed to remove forever the possibility of a totalitarian dictatorship in Russia are so dramatically interrelated. I state to you that we have the firm determination and the political will to move forward. We have proved that by what we have done.

It is Russia that has put an end to imperial policies and was the first to recognize the independence of the Baltic

republics. Russia is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has averted uncontrollable disintegration of the former empire and the threat of a general interethnic bloodbath. Russia has granted real rights to its autonomous components. The Federation Treaty has been signed and our state has escaped the fate of the Soviet Union. Russia has preserved its unity.

It was Russia that substantially slowed down the pace of militarization and is doing all it can to stop it altogether. I am announcing with full responsibility that without waiting for a treaty or an agreement to be signed, we already have begun taking off combat alert [snyatiye iz boyevogo dezhurstva] the heavy SS-18 missiles targeted on the United States of America. The Russian defense minister who is present here will confirm that. [passage omitted]

Today, when the period of global confrontation has ended, I call upon you to take a fresh look at the United States' present policy toward Russia and also to take a fresh look at the prospects for our relations. Russia already is different, but, I will be frank, sometimes some people in your country still use the concepts and methods of the previous policy. Sometimes the old approaches brought into being by a different era are artificially imposed on new realities. True, that applies equally to us. Let us together learn to resolve differences on the most effective, democratic basis—as partners. This is in the spirit of both the American and Russian character. If this is done, many of the problems that are now impeding mutually advantageous cooperation between Russia and the United States will disappear, including legislative issues. It will not require useless sacrifices, but, on the contrary, it will allow both your problems and our problems to be resolved more effectively. First and foremost, it will create new jobs in Russia—as well as in the United States. History is giving us a chance to fulfill President Wilson's dream, namely, to make the world safe for democracy. [applause] [passage omitted]

Official Notes START Ratification Progress

PM 1806090792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet commission for questions of defense and security, by Captain Second Rank O. Odnokolenko; place and date of interview not given: "Is Parliament Ready To Ratify Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty?"—first paragraph is introduction, final paragraph is postscript]

[Text] Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committee for questions of defense and security, answers your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's questions.

[Odnokolenko] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, a session of the Russian Supreme Soviet committee for questions of defense and security was held recently which again

examined the terms for our parliament's ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms [START] treaty. What were its results?

[Piskunov] As you know, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committee for questions of defense and security suspended the ratification of the START treaty in connection with the vagueness of the ratification procedures. After the protocol had been signed in Lisbon, we deemed it possible to continue ratification. The leaders of the leading research institutes of the branches of the armed forces of the nuclear triad were invited to the committee's session and a specific talk was held with them on military-technical aspects of the treaty, including possible initiatives in that direction by both the United States and Russia. The discussion was substantive. Now, when it is already clear to us that we will hardly succeed in finding money both for armament and for disarmament, we must weigh each step particularly painstakingly and approach each assessment of priorities in the nuclear triad scrupulously.

[Odnokolenko] Perhaps it is already obvious that the balance and equilibrium of combat potential is a temporary state. You yourself note that even from the economic viewpoint Russia will hardly be able to follow the terms of the START treaty dictated by the United States.

[Piskunov] The point is—and it is a fundamental element—that no one has yet determined precisely enough what is the level of unacceptable damage and how many nuclear warheads would need to be delivered for this purpose to the territory of some hypothetical enemy. And when there is no precise assessment of the level of unacceptable damage, to talk of whether or not we will ensure nuclear-strategic balance is rather complicated. But both we and the Americans understand well that with the existing restrictions under the ABM treaty even a substantial reduction of strategic offensive weapons still does not guarantee nuclear parity. Another problem is far more serious—the possible "spread" of nuclear weapons to third countries.

[Odnokolenko] If there was talk of the possibility of reducing strategic offensive weapons below the set level without substantially violating the strategic balance, then consequently a unilateral reduction of our defense potential is entirely feasible.

[Piskunov] We are prepared to conduct talks on reduction on a mutual basis and to analyze such proposals seriously. But, I repeat, in parliament there is the opinion that a reduction according to this scenario could cost us too dear.

[Odnokolenko] But this option is possible and it seems to me it should be considered. After all, it may happen that we, as the committee session said, because of economic conditions simply will be unable to keep within the framework of the START treaty.

[Piskunov] Undoubtedly, if the terms of the treaty and the reduction procedure are such that we are in fact unable to implement them...Right now we believe that we will still be able to fulfill the START Treaty

According to our assessments we have sufficient resources for this. But the further reduction, the further alteration of the structure of the strategic nuclear forces, could be beyond the power of either our economy or our social policy.

[Odnokolenko] Well, of course this must be taken into account. But what is the overall mood in parliament: are the deputies prepared to ratify the START Treaty? If they are, then how soon might this happen?

[Piskunov] The two last rounds of hearings attest that the START Treaty could soon be ratified by Russia. But there is a fundamental element. Even if the Russian parliament ratifies this treaty, the ratification instrument can be handed over only after Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as nonnuclear states sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without that condition Russia can hardly assume responsibility for observing the START treaty.

[Odnokolenko] Especially as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are to become states acceding to the START Treaty...

[Piskunov] Yes, these states will become parties to the START Treaty but here they have unconditionally signed commitments rapidly to accede to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as nonnuclear states. We are following this process attentively. And I believe that we have a certain reserve in terms of time. At the same time we are observing no less closely the way in which the process of ratification by the American side is being prepared. Unless the treaty is ratified before the election of the new U.S. president, there is a danger that it will not be ratified at all.

[Odnokolenko] Nonetheless, to judge by the position of our former opponents and former allies, we will simply be compelled to reexamine our defense priorities with a consideration for Russian interests.

[Piskunov] The economic and political situation demands from us the readiness and ability to defend Russia's interests independently. Of course, it would be better to resolve questions in dialogue, but on questions of disarmament our position should nonetheless be more independent. [Piskunov ends]

Essential Postscript

At the time the Lisbon protocol was signed the Russian side deemed it necessary to issue a written statement. It highlighted three main elements. First, Russia proceeds from the premise that the commitments enshrined in the messages from the top leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the U.S. President have been assumed with regard to all other aspects of the START Treaty. It

also proceeds from the premise that seven years after the treaty enters into force there will be no nuclear weapons nor the strategic means for their delivery on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Second, Russia expects these states to accede to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons no later than the date of the entry into force of the START treaty and will consider this when planning the time for the exchange of instruments of ratification. Third, Russia views Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as states which do not have nuclear weapons by the time the protocol is signed and notes that their participation in the protocol confirms and strengthens their nonnuclear status.

'Unprecedented Reduction in Nuclear Arsenals'

92UM1177A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Leonov: "Yeltsin and Bush Have Made Their Meeting Historic: An Unprecedented Reduction in the Nuclear Arsenals of the Two Biggest Nuclear Powers Has Been Announced"]

[Text] By the start of the 21st century—by the year 2003 or 2000 even—the total number of warheads in the arsenals of Moscow and Washington will have been reduced from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000 weapons. This was announced in Washington in a joint statement by U.S. President George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation. In the period leading up to the year 2003 or the year 2000 (the shortening of the timeframe is connected with Russia being rendered the corresponding assistance on the part of the United States) our countries will reduce the number of warheads in their nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 per side, and each of them will itself here determine the structure of its forces within the said limits. As a result of a two-stage reduction ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with separating warheads (MIRV'd ICBM's) will be eliminated entirely, and a cap of 1,700-1,750 warheads is established for ballistic missiles on submarines (SLBM's). The presidents intend shortly putting the agreements which have been reached down on paper signing a brief document, and presenting it for consideration and ratification to the legislative bodies of Russia and the United States.

Commenting on the new character of bilateral relations with the United States, President Yeltsin emphasized "We will not fight one another. We are switching to a path of partnership and friendship, and these relations will be enshrined in a special charter." This charter together with a sizable package of other Russian-American documents, was signed on Wednesday by the Russian and American presidents in the White House. During the negotiations the presidents adopted a decision on the creation at a high level of a group for the practical implementation, in contact with allies and other interested countries, of measures pertaining to the

formulation and realization of a concept of a global system of protection against limited strikes employing ballistic missiles.

The disarmament accords which have been reached, which Yeltsin and Bush announced in a joint statement, impart a truly historic character to the first Russian-American summit. Such is the opinion not only of the participants in the top-level negotiations but also of representatives of the administration of both countries, whence comments on the first impressive results of the meeting in Washington are coming.

A spokesman for the head of the British Government welcomed "the success of this meeting, which has far-reaching consequences," as he addressed journalists at the prime minister's London residence. A similar statement was made in Tokyo on behalf of the Japanese Government by Koichi Kato, general secretary of the Japanese Cabinet, who pointed out that the Russian-American accord, which had been reached under conditions of the end of the "cold war" within an extremely short space of time, was of an epoch-making nature. "The present accord has considerably exceeded our expectations," Kato acknowledged.

The joint statement of the Russian and American presidents has evoked considerable argument in parliamentary and military circles of Russia. Parliament is of the opinion that whereas fulfillment of START signed by Gorbachev and Bush is possible, albeit attended by certain financial difficulties, a more radical reduction in nuclear arsenals could prove questionable on account of Russia's lack of resources. In Russian military circles, on the other hand, there is particular uncertainty concerning the extent to which the reductions declared by the presidents have been thought out.

One way or another it is obvious that regardless of the attitude toward the Russian-American disarmament accords achieved at the summit meeting, the joint statement of Yeltsin and Bush has not only become the main event of the summit, which concludes today, but is also in a sense a fateful landmark on the path leading away from the dangerous nuclear confrontation of the two states and toward a stable and secure world, responsibility for the future of which the great democratic powers are prepared to share. It is to this category that America is disposed to attribute Yeltsin's Russia. President Bush, incidentally, compared the Russian leader with Peter the Great, who helped Russia understand itself anew, terming Yeltsin the first leader in the history of our country whose power is based not on a confluence of historical circumstances but on a democratic mandate.

Col Gen Pyankov: Yeltsin-Bush Accords Cause 'Uneasiness'

OW/90608/892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0744 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Colonel General Boris Pyankov, acting First Deputy Commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS, feels that the START agreement [as received] signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in Washington "is the product of common sense." However, Pyankov said in an interview with INTERFAX correspondent Marina Chernukha, "something still causes uneasiness among the military." Mainly, Russia is reducing the most powerful of its weapons—the ground-based surface-to-surface missiles. The Americans, who always preferred an underwater nuclear fleet with Trident missiles, will reduce them completely. [sentence as received] "We are taking a risk," said General Pyankov, "but we are doing so consciously as we see a true movement toward disarmament on the American side."

At the same time Pyankov feels the fears that the dismantling of nuclear warheads will seriously hurt the Russian economy are unfounded as keeping them in nuclear arsenals is also very costly.

Missile Cuts To Lead to 'Strategic Parity'

PM/1906092392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Savelyev, vice president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Research and member of the London Strategic Research Institute, by Sergey Guk under the "Events and Comments" rubric, place and date not given: "Russian Security Will Only Be Strengthened As a Result of the New Agreements with the United States on the Reduction of Strategic Weapons"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] At IZVESTIYA's request, disarmament expert Aleksandr Savelyev, vice president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Research and a member of the London Strategic Research Institute, comments on the new Russian-U.S. agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons.

[Guk] Seven years ago the West rejected—as propagandistic—Gorbachev's plan for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000. Today Yeltsin is, without any apparent effort, achieving wholesale reductions of Russian and U.S. nuclear missile potentials by a factor of two-thirds. How can you explain this?

[Savelyev] To my mind, it is wrong to speak of a wholesale reduction. You can trace very major work on details in the agreement. There is no question of any chaotic disarmament race. It is another matter that it is not entirely clear where the figure of two-thirds, which is cited in all the reports, came from. The total number of Russian and U.S. strategic weapons is in reality in the order of 21,000 units. The future limit for the sides has been determined as 6,000-7,000. But this just means sea- and land-based ballistic missile warheads. There is not a word about aviation weapons. Either they have decided to make aviation "nuclear-free," which is doubtful, or else they have simply "forgotten" to mention it. I hope

that the misunderstanding is cleared up, and another 5,000 weapons minimum are added to the number of 6,000-7,000. That means that it will be a question of a 50-percent reduction, and this is realistic. The indicator of two-thirds only relates to missile warheads.

[Guk] In any event radical reductions are imminent. Which of the sides will find itself in the more favorable position in the end?

[Savelyev] The volumes of the scheduled reductions are mesmerizing many people. But the security of a state is determined not so much by the number of strategic forces as by their structure and quality. Neither Russia nor the United States will obtain unilateral advantages from the scheduled reductions. But they, and with them the whole world, will win something more: Strategic stability will be strengthened following the transition from multiple-charge to single-charge ICBM's. And to my mind, the most important result of the agreement is that strategic parity is being established, no longer at the level of USSR-United States, but at the level of Russia-United States.

[Guk] The former leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense always categorically rejected the elimination of the SS-18. It must have had some reason for this?

[Savelyev] There were reasons. The prevailing viewpoint was that, the more weapons we had that struck fear into Americans' hearts, the better for our security.

[Guk] Why was there a need for us to put forward reciprocal proposals on the elimination of strategic weapons ahead of schedule ourselves? After all, the reductions are a heavy burden on our economy as it is.

[Savelyev] Evidently at the moment we cannot get away from stereotypes that say that every more or less significant action must without fail be timed to coincide with a big date—in this case the year 2000. Nevertheless, to my mind, insofar as we are able, we should relieve the load on the economy and the state budget instead of overstraining them.

[Guk] All the indications are that the ABM Treaty has been safely forgotten, and both sides are talking about a global system for defense against limited nuclear strikes. Is such a development of events better or worse for us?

[Savelyev] The Russian side has not yet renounced the ABM Treaty. And at the same time Moscow is involved in the creation of a joint global defense system. These things are mutually exclusive. Sooner or later a choice will have to be made. And, as I understand it, the global system for defense against a nuclear attack is preferable for Russia as compared with the 20-year-old ABM restrictions elaborated during the Cold War. The ABM Treaty will not realistically protect the country and a warning system, even a joint one, will not do so either. We need realistic means of defense against a potential threat.

ITAR-TASS Summary of Accords on Arms Cuts
924C18154 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian
19 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[ITAR-TASS summary: "Experts Clarify"]

[Text] According to data of an influential research organization, the Association of Supporters of Arms Control, and the Ministry of Defense, the agreements reached appear as follows. By the year 2000 or 2003, the United States is eliminating all 50 of its land-based MX nuclear missiles with 10 nuclear warheads each. The process of eliminating the Minuteman-2 nuclear missiles will be accelerated. The United States presently has in its inventory 450 of these missiles with two warheads each. The number of warheads on the 500 land-based Minuteman-3 missiles will be reduced from three to one. What is more, the number of warheads on all 18 Trident-class nuclear-powered missile carrying submarines (the basis of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces) will be cut in half. Presently, each Trident carries 24 nuclear missiles with eight multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles [MIRV's]. The number of warheads on these systems will be reduced from eight to four.

All told, in the first phase of the accords (by 1999), the United States is to have 4,250 nuclear warheads left, and Russia 3,800.

By the end of the period of the accords, by the year 2000 or 2003, the U.S. arsenal will retain the following (approximate figures):

—3,492 nuclear weapons. These include: 1,728 on Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's], 1,264 on air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's] and bombers, and 500 on land-based missiles with a single warhead.

Russia has the right to retain about 3,000 warheads: 1,750 SLBM's, 800 on ALCM's and bombers, and 500 on land based missiles with a single warhead.

Further Reports On U.S.-Russian Summit

Cheney Meets With Grachev

LD1906132792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1124 GMT 19 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington June 19 TASS—I am working together with Russian Defence Minister Grachev at ways of putting into effect the history-making reductions of long-range nuclear weapon arsenals, announced on June 16 by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney has stated. According to a statement of the U.S. Department of Defence, circulated here on Friday [17 June], it was the first visit of a Russian defence minister to the Pentagon.

When welcoming Grachev, Cheney praised the history-making agreement reached by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, on a further radical reduction of the stockpiles of long-range missile warheads and the destruction of the remaining ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independent warheads within the coming ten years. At the same time, Cheney said a treaty on arms control in this sphere remained to be concluded, and the reduction of the number of warheads is a long-term project.

The head of the Pentagon expressed satisfaction over the fact that both sides brought down considerably the level of stand-by alert of their armed forces. He also stressed that his meeting with General Grachev was evidence of the improvement of American-Russian relations, of progress in the sphere of security problems which are of much importance for both countries, as well as of the expansion of the existing military contacts. According to the Pentagon statement, Cheney and Grachev discussed ways of strengthening Russian-American relations in the sphere of defence.

Grachev on Arms Cuts

PM 1806192992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jun 92 p 1

[Captain First Rank V. Kuzar report: "Hopeful Prospects for Cooperation"]

[Excerpt] Washington, 18 Jun—[Passage omitted] How does the Russian defense minister assess the agreements reached in the sphere of security? I asked Army General P. Grachev, who is part of the Russian delegation, this question.

"What has been achieved in the military sphere is of enormous significance," he stressed. "Only dilettantes can claim that we are the losers or have made some kind of concessions to the United States during the talks. One or two hundred missiles mean nothing today. The main thing is that general security is being strengthened, the enemy image is disappearing, and an atmosphere of partnership and all-around cooperation is being created. The meetings and conversations held here in Washington have convinced me that the Americans genuinely want to help us."

The Russian defense minister also said that he had a meeting in the Pentagon with U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney. A whole series of problems was discussed there: joint verification of the destruction of strategic offensive weapons, U.S. aid for the formation of storage bases for tactical nuclear weapons that have been withdrawn to Russia from the territories of other republics and are subject to destruction, and U.S. assistance in securing the release of Russian servicemen who are in captivity in Afghanistan. The discussion of a number of concrete measures in expanding cooperation in the military sphere was particularly significant. There is the exchange of delegations, including at soldier-sailor level, the creation of a joint military college with both

Russian and American instructors, and joint exercises. Agreement was reached that the Russian defense minister will pay an official visit to the United States in the near future, and that all questions of cooperation in the military sphere will be discussed in more detail then [Passage omitted]

Arms Reductions Reviewed

PM 1906200992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Jun 92 p 2

[Observer Aleksandr Golts "Topic of the Week" commentary: "Farewell to Arms"]

[Text] It so happened that the Russian president's visit to the United States, during which unprecedented nuclear arms cuts were approved, fell on the eve of the anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War—probably the most poignant event in our history, which, as is well known, is not lacking in tragedies. This was a coincidence, of course. And it would not be merely essentially wrong, it would be downright blasphemous to seek some kind of parallel between the treaties once signed with Berlin and those sealed in Washington a few days ago. Still less do I intend to join the not very harmonious but extremely noisy chorus of those who hasten to accuse B. Yeltsin of all but conniving with the Americans.

The point lies elsewhere. Willy-nilly you ask yourself what the guarantees of our security consist of today, and whether it is possible to reliably ensure our security by pursuing disarmament alone. The bitterness engendered by the defeats of the "accursed" year of 1941 appears to be genetically transmissible. It was these defeats which gave us an idea which seemed axiomatic until quite recently—that our country was safe only as long as we were not inferior to anyone in the world in terms of military might.

You will agree that B. Yeltsin's actions in Washington do not fit in with this approach. He agreed to an accord which does not merely reduce the two countries' nuclear arsenals by a factor of three. In the opinion of most U.S. experts, this accord gives the United States certain advantages in the military sphere. "According to U.S. officials and arms control specialists," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes in this context, "the accord envisages the elimination of the Russian nuclear arms which present the greatest threat, while at the same time, it allows the United States to retain its most sophisticated missiles."

Here is the opinion of Dzh. Mendelson [name as transliterated], deputy director of the Arms Control Association: "On paper it seems that both sides are cutting their forces equally. However, in reality, the Russians are giving up the cornerstone of their arsenal—land-based multiple-warhead missiles, while we retain our positions regarding sea-launched ballistic missiles, in which we have superiority."

Speaking exclusively about the quantities of specific types of arms, this is indeed true.

However, if our politicians are farsighted, if their calculations are correct, and if they are confident that no one is planning to blackmail us with nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, still less attack us, then is it really worth devoting the last of our strength to maintaining military equilibrium with the richest country in the world?

Giving up attempts to maintain this parity could be a real boon for our country. However, in my opinion, only under very specific conditions. Today only lazy people do not say that a state's security is not maintained exclusively, or even largely, by military means. This is self-evident. Something else is causing concern: The rapid reduction of the military factor in ensuring Russia's security is still not being accompanied by anything like an equivalent reinforcement of other factors. Economic or social factors, for example.

Those who claim that the United States has today, and will have in the future, considerably stronger security guarantees than Russia are right. It is not a matter here of a few hundred extra warheads. It is a matter of the level of production and of the U.S. economy's level of integration into the world economy. It is precisely the interdependence of economies which ensures a situation where states, no matter how acute their differences, seek to avoid the large-scale use of military force (local and ethnic conflicts are a different matter).

Russia has still not achieved this level of integration. Viewed from the angle of strengthening security, B. Yeltsin's current actions in seeking to secure cooperation between our two countries, and an influx of foreign investments into our country, indicate that the president and his team are trying to bring the economic factor into play.

It appears that B. Yeltsin is close to success. In a situation where the U.S. lawmakers were by no means inclined to appropriate funds for aiding Russia, the president, addressing Congress, was able to persuade his audience that it is necessary to do this, above all, in the interests of U.S. security. ABC reported that leaders of both chambers of Congress stated that Yeltsin's speech probably reversed the prevailing mood in respect to the question of granting aid.

However, only time will tell how long the positive effect brought about by the current visit will last. Let's be frank: The situation in Russia is still, by no means, conducive to large-scale economic cooperation with other countries. Consequently, in regards to the economic component of security, the situation is not brilliant (let's not forget that the arms reductions themselves will call for enormous expenditure). As for sociopolitical stability, the situation is even worse.

Therefore, the implementation of the president's revolutionary decision will be filled not only with the hope for

a safer world, but also with challenges. Good or bad, the very existence of a powerful nuclear potential, even in the current complex conditions, is a guarantee that other states (not necessarily the United States) will not dare to exploit our weakness. It is absolutely necessary right now to define the minimum nuclear forces and means which are essential in order to ensure that the inhabitants of Russia can pursue peaceful labor. Here it will obviously be necessary to bear in mind that our conventional forces are currently going through hard times in connection with local conflicts and the processes of troop cuts and withdrawals.

It is hardly necessary to be afraid of the existing challenges. The reduction of nuclear potential will not take place overnight. However, a period of 9 or 13 years is not a very long time. The question is whether, during this period, we will manage to overcome the crisis and find our feet at least to some extent. If we do, then nuclear warheads will not be greatly needed. If not, it will mean that, having given up the cornerstone of our nuclear potential, we will have lost even the formal attributes of a great power.

'Chances of Cheating' Eyed

LD2106185692 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 21 Jun 92

[Vadim Soloveyev Commentary]

[Text] The new strategic arms deal that Moscow and Washington struck last week provides for slashing each other's nuclear stockpiles by two-thirds spread over a period of 11 years. Commentary is by Vadim Solov'yev:

The new level of dialogue leading to a review of older approaches to the issue of nuclear weapons may have been behind the scene of the decision to give up completely the main component of Russia's strategic forces, ground-launched multiple warheads, ICBMs SS-18 and SS-24. For their part the Americans are expected to halve [as heard] the number of their missiles aboard strategic cruisers, something that they refused to talk about in the past. The concept of nuclear parity is filled with new content, being based on mutual trust rather than suspicion as before. The sides have agreed that there is no need to count each missile, warhead or bomb, defining numbers to be scrapped over an 11 years period instead. However, the remaining stockpiles will be large enough to ensure defense sufficiency. To allay fears by other nuclear powers, Russia and the United States offer them to take part in the development of a global anti-missile system to be used in the event of inadvertent missile launches. Some in Russia say Mr. Yeltsin struck the deal behind the back of the military, and that is why the new strategic arms agreement will be given a hostile reception in Moscow. But the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Forces, General Boris Pyankov, disagrees. This is what he said: Various level meetings were held, also involving officials of the Defense Ministry and the Command of Convention [as heard] and strategic

forces to discuss pros and cons. Although doubts are raised, he said, as to whether it is right to do away with the country's main nuclear deterrent at a time when the Americans leave their nuclear-powered submarine fleet intact. There is a sincere drive for nuclear disarmament on both sides. General Pyankov said there was some risk, but the chances of cheating were non-existent.

USA Institute Official Interviewed

LD2106083492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2230 GMT 19 Jun 92

[From the "Top Priority" program]

[Excerpts] Welcome to Top Priority. I'm Irina Tkachenko.

The first Russian-American summit took place this past week. The Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, called the summit outstanding and the results of the summit were remarkable according to many observers here in Moscow yet one hears not only words of praise but rumblings of criticism and the question whether the Russian foreign policy, as outlined by Boris Yeltsin, serves the Russian national interest. Does it or does it not?

I'm talking to a man who knows more about Russian-American relations than most people in Moscow, Dr. Sergey Plekhanov, deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies here in Moscow, who has recently returned from the United States and is about to go there shortly. [passage omitted].

A major victory or a major concession, as some newspapers in Moscow have described the treaty?

[Plekhanov] Mr. Yeltsin has emphasized in his speech in Washington that we are abandoning the concept of parity and that has been seized upon by conservatives and military hardliners here in Moscow as an abomination.

I think there is an asymmetry between the way this treaty is going to be sold in Washington and the way it is going to be sold in Moscow. In Moscow there is a vested interest in presenting the treaty as a way to get a big concession from Russia. That certainly is seen by the Administration as a better way to sell the treaty and to sell the package of economic assistance to Russia. In other words, in a tight fisted Congress besieged with domestic claims for spending the idea of giving any money to Russia has to be balanced with something from Russia so apparently there is a trade off. You see the Russians are abandoning their heavy missiles and we're helping them through the dire straits with our assistance.

In Russia the politics of selling the treaty is different. Here it has to be sold as a treaty which does not damage Russian national security. The numbers of the warheads that are going to remain with both Russia and the United States by the start of the 21st century are pretty much like an equality in numbers. There is flexibility there which, I think, is a good thing because bean counting has been discredited.

[Tkachenko] Let me give you one reason why some people here were puzzled by this treaty. Everybody remembers that about ten days ago, speaking the Russian Defense Ministry, Boris Yeltsin said that the United States, in negotiations over nuclear disarmament, was trying to gain advantage over Russia and that he would maintain the policy of nuclear parity, which he is now abandoning, as you have said. Several days later, in Washington, he signs an agreement which was described by (?Jack Mendelsohn), deputy director of the Arms Control Association, as follows, and here I quote:

On paper it looks like the two forces will be reduced equally but in fact the Russians will be giving up the backbone of their arsenal—land based multiple warhead missiles—while we will be retaining the area of our greatest strength—the sea based ballistic missiles. In other words, while Russians will be relinquishing their most powerful missiles the Americans will merely be thinning out their most sophisticated missiles.

And that set many people wondering whether this is what you can call the national interest of Russia.

[Plekhanov] I think (?Mendelsohn's) quote, and (?Mendelsohn) is a leading expert in the United States on arms control—and a radical disarmer I might say—(?Mendelsohn's) comment only underscores the point I have made, namely that the politics of selling this treaty in the United States requires that Russian concessions be emphasized.

The concessions which the Americans have made in this treaty, abandoning their most modern submarine launched ballistic systems, reducing the number of warheads that they'll be able to put on those missiles, and reducing the number, the total number, of those weapons by three times. I think that it is really a very substantial concession.

If you talk about the Russian ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] in the first place, for seven years the Russians will continue to keep a three digit number of several hundred heavy ICBMs. Then when we do away with our ICBMs completely, our multiple warhead ICBMs, the Americans will do likewise. [passage omitted]

I think it's a major victory for Russia. The fact that the SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], the most modern SLBMs, are going to be reduced by the United States, something which they staunchly avoided doing for years, I think it's a major victory.

But there is more to it. Let's think about those land based ICBMs. What are they for, what they can do and what problems they can cause. Many of those ICBMs are not in Russia, they are in the other nuclear republics. [passage omitted].

But I mean this treaty, which provides for the complete elimination of those missiles, reinforces the intention of both Russia and the world community to prevent the proliferation of these very, very dangerous weapons.

But there is more to it, there is the question of what these missiles really are all about. Knowledgeable people have known for some time that these missiles are sitting ducks, that they are the kind of weapons which are most likely to be used first in a crisis. But if anybody uses a nuclear weapon first that's an act of suicide. [passage omitted]

[Tkachenko] There is another aspect to this treaty which is alarming to some people here in Russia and that is the cost of nuclear disarmament. This country has been a party to nuclear disarmament processes for long enough to know how costly this business is. The dismantling of hundreds upon hundreds of nuclear missiles and the burying of the nuclear waste or nuclear fuel, on the territory of Russia or any other republic, is going to cost billions and billions of rubles. Why now, when the country needs every ruble so badly? One can't help wondering whether Mr. Yeltsin was not driven by his desire to outshine his predecessor, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, who only last fall concluded a major strategic arms reduction treaty. Any comment?

[Plekhanov] When you're dealing, when you're defusing a minefield where you want to sow some corn or wheat or something it is a costly operation but still if you have to deal with this minefield you have to do it so that's a cost which you have to bear if you want to live in a safe world. I understand that there is recognition on the American part that they would have to help Russia economically in dismantling that arsenal. This is not a handout, this is again based on a recognition that our interests here are the same. [passage omitted]

[Tkachenko] And finally what do you think will Boris Yeltsin be able to tell the Russians, you know the people who are usually referred to as the common Russians, the people out in the streets who are not that much preoccupied with big political issues. They do not care that much, not think in terms of nuclear disarmament or of better relations with the United States. They are burdened with day to day problems, with the continuing and exacerbating crisis. Will there be anything for him to bring home?

[Plekhanov] There is a lot for him to bring home. I think that he is bringing home the much reduced fear of nuclear confrontation. He is bringing home the palpable evidence of the fact that the cold war is over, that we no longer need be afraid of the Americans. We will be scaling down our nuclear arsenals to a level where none of the two sides will be able to start a nuclear war with any hope of winning it. The residual nuclear arsenals, which will be taken care of at a later stage, will be good only for defense. And I think that the idea of us and Americans no longer being enemies but becoming friends and partners is very, very popular. I am happy

that we are no longer in a country where there is a total agreement of everyone with whatever the government does.

The results of Boris Yeltsin's visit to the United States stand on their merit. I for one was proud to see him and hear him address the joint session of Congress and see senators and congressmen jump up 11 times. It was a proud speech, it was a speech of somebody who has won the trust of his people in an honest and straightforward way. Look, a lot of Russians now feel a kind inferiority complex. The missiles do not make you proud of your country because you know that this is a weapon you can not use anyway. What makes you proud of your country is certain principles that your country stands on. Again wealth is not the most important thing here but principles and the respect that you get from others, I think Yeltsin has built up respect for Russia in the United States and I don't see anything like the majority of Russians who will feel all the worse because of that. I think that Russians will understand Yeltsin correctly.

[Tkachenko] Thank you very much indeed. Dr. Sergey Plekhanov, deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies here in Moscow, was the guest on today's Top Priority. We are wishing Dr. Plekhanov a very good trip to the United States and we are saying goodbye for at least another year. From me, Irina Tkachenko, goodbye and good listening.

Results of Visit Viewed

PM1806202192 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
19 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Vladimir Nadein report: "Yeltsin Did Not Waste This Opportunity"]

[Text] During his visit to the United States, B.N. Yeltin was able to show convincingly, how powerful a weapon sincerity is.

Few politicians recognize this quality to be a necessity, and even fewer see it as a virtue. Yeltsin decided that it is only by means of complete directness that the ice of age-old mutual suspicion can be exploded.

He did not merely reject double standards; he assumed a huge and unparalleled responsibility by stating that there will be no more lies, and not just in the future, but never again.

Of course, he was aware that his audience's applause does not mean that it is ready to share these principles, still less to follow them. He did not demand reciprocity; he was speaking only about his country's moral commitment.

If Yeltsin can prove by his actions that his policy recognizes no compromises with the truth, then it will not be a package of Soviet-U.S. agreements, however important these may be, nor the unparalleled ovations in

the emotional U.S. Congress that will go down in history, but the return of the true, great meaning of the word "friendship."

People used to laugh a great deal at this word, particularly when it was used in connection with Russian-U.S. relations. Indeed, even now it is uttered with some degree of irony. This irony is not so much the display of an uninhibited mind as a tribute to the traditionally cynical idea of friendship as a trap for political simpletons.

Yeltsin cut through these traditions, affirming simplicity and openness in relations as the key to a new world.

His rejection of the ideology of strategic weapons parity also was explained unpretentiously. It was not that he revealed a great secret by linking all our mountains of weapons with the abyss of our poverty. People before him knew this, and they knew it without him, but the people before him were embarrassed to say it, and without him they were afraid to admit it.

Yeltsin will return to Moscow with a suitcase full of agreements, the importance of which no one can deny. The problem of the reduction of strategic weapons has been resolved for the foreseeable future. There are no longer any political barriers—only technical ones—to destroying the terrifying weapons.

There is no reason to empty the vaults of Russian banks hastily to receive the U.S. \$24 billion. The Freedom Support Bill, as the draft on support for the Russian economic reforms is rather pompously called, moved much closer to reality following the visit, but it is still far from being a reality.

Once again the U.S. business world has applauded the invitation to hurry into the immense Russian market, but applause to presidents is only a warm-up for investors. Only ruble convertibility can serve as the starting signal.

These unresolved problems leave the Russian president's visit open to criticism. To use previous yardsticks, Yeltsin, like Gorbachev before him, can be reproached for continuing to play at giveaway, and Yeltsin already is being criticized for unilateral disarmament and for the fact that—no, not now, not in the next few years, but on the threshold of the next millennium—Russia will be left with a paltry nuclear arsenal capable of destroying only half of the earth instead of destroying it 1,000 times over.

Possibly there really is some risk in this, but even those who are prepared to reproach Yeltsin for a bad bargain should be influenced by the trade argument, which is so close to their hearts. If we are speaking about the even-handedness of the deal, then the Russian president exchanged the risk of remote non-parity for a sharply increased chance of peace and cooperation with the most powerful country in the world.

Will this partnership become genuine friendship? Will the Americans share the dubious secrets of their history

with the same frankness with which Yeltsin is prepared to share ours with them? Will they write off their nuclear submarines for scrap in the same resolute "unparalleled" way in which Russia removed its mighty SS-18 missiles from alert status?

There are many questions that only the future can answer, but whatever happens, no one will reproach the Russian president for wasting his opportunity during these two June days.

Minister Quizzed on Planned Warhead Elimination

PM2306143992 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
20 Jun 92 p 3

[“Express Interview” with Professor V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister for atomic energy, by Anatoliy Pokrovskiy; place and date not given: “Dismantling Bombs Is Not Simple”—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The agreement between the United States and Russia to eliminate a large number of nuclear warheads is not only a major political step, but also a very complex technological task. Professor V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister of atomic energy, gave *PRAVDA* a preliminary assessment of this aspect of the question.

[Pokrovskiy] Viktor Nikitovich, presumably performance of this task lies on the shoulders of your ministry?

[Mikhaylov] Of course. The missiles will be dismantled by those who made them. This operation will be carried out at the same enterprises where the corresponding products were created.

[Pokrovskiy] Evidently it is not a cheap or fast business....

[Mikhaylov] I can name a preliminary figure—dismantling a nuclear charge is only 20 percent cheaper than creating it. But it cannot be ruled out that an “insurance payment” will be required, and then dismantling could turn out to be more expensive than assembly. And of course, it will take several decades and several tens of thousand billion rubles. Therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of international cooperation involving foreign funding. And we will pay by using the nuclear materials in power engineering.

[Pokrovskiy] Incidentally, reports have appeared that the Americans are already prepared to allocate us \$400 million to create a depository for nuclear materials in Tomsk-7.

[Mikhaylov] Yes, there is talk of this, although we have not received a cent yet. At the same time, the issue of storing nuclear materials is one of the most important. Most importantly, it is not so much a technological as a political question. It is the politicians who must consider all the subtleties of ensuring the nonproliferation of fissionable materials, what happens if they leak, and the possibilities of utilizing them.

[Pokrovskiy] In short, both diplomats and scientists have a lot of work ahead....

[Mikhaylov] Of course; after all, we will be solving very difficult problems which mankind has never before encountered on such a scale.

Solton Sees World 'Becoming a Safer Place'

LD2206161792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 22 Jun 92

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] Next, Yuriy Solton analyzes the political side of the Washington agreement to slash strategic offensive arms still further.

The new agreements providing for a two-thirds cut in the most powerful nuclear arms of the two countries took a mere five months to draft. Previous agreements and of a far lesser scale required fifteen years. This contrast alone shows the degree of trust between Russia and the United States. It was not a dialogue between two super powers seeking global supremacy or potential enemies, but partners in building a new democratic world order.

Before, it would take years to find out whether or not the other side would gain anything from the reduction of even one missile. The general climate of fear and mutual suspicion was an excuse for that.

The era of confrontation is now gone. These days agreements are based on mutual trust and unilateral and reciprocal moves.

However, this does not mean that Moscow and Washington are careless in their attitude to security matters. But we point out that in drafting a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty the ultimate objective was to ensure that neither side should have any reason to suspect, even hypothetically, that security might be harmed. This goal seems to have been achieved.

However, in both the United States and Russia there are certain circles who still view the agreements signed by President Yeltsin and President Bush from the old angle—namely, who stands to gain and who stands to lose.

Rightwingers in Russia seeking revenge for their defeat in August last year, have been quick to say that the Washington agreements are against Russia's national interests. President Yeltsin has described such statements as insulting. He described the Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement as a very good basis for stability in the world and for calm in each family and the certainty that there will be no war.

Indeed, how many nuclear devices need there be to make a country secure against any incidents?

Currently Russia and the United States have a total of 21,000 powerful strategic nuclear warheads carried by

bombers, submarines and land-launched missiles. As a result of the reduction, each side will have three thousand to three and a half thousand such warheads.

Is that many or few?

It is too many. Already now Moscow and Washington should think what they should do next to reduce nuclear arms still further.

Russia has already started working on specific measures to prepare for the elimination of strategic missiles and warheads. This type of military hardware will be eliminated at three places: near Arzamas, Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk. Besides in a goodwill gesture, Russia has begun to withdraw from operational service heavy missiles with multiple warheads—the SS-18. The United States has taken similar steps. Britain and France have declared their intention to reduce nuclear arms, too. The world is becoming a safer place to live in.

Quick Elimination of Nuclear Arms 'Detimental'

OW2206164192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 22 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "An accelerated schedule of eliminating strategic nuclear armaments may prove detrimental for Russia," said Aleksandr Savelyev, a Russian expert in disarmament, Vice-President of the Russian Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies and a member of the London Institute of Strategic Studies.

He told IF [INTERFAX] on Monday [22 June] that he highly estimated the bracket agreement reached in Washington by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush, according to which the United States' and Russia's strategic nuclear arsenals will be cut down from the aggregate level of 21,000 warheads to 6,000-7,000.

Savelyev believes that Russia should be oriented to the year 2003, not the year 2000. Both of these time-tables were discussed in Washington. "Even in a normal economic setting, a seven-year schedule would be too tough for Russia." In the current situation such a schedule is simply unreal, he said.

Grachev Defends Strategic Arms Cut Accords

PM2206202192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Interview with Army General P. Grachev, Russian defense minister, by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Kononenko and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain First Class V. Kuzar; place and date not given; "Russia's Security Will Be More Reliable With Deep Strategic Offensive Arms Cuts"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The Russian and U.S. presidents reached agreement in Washington 17 June on cutting strategic offensive arms. This agreement has met with varying assessments in the mass media—from a breakthrough which will lead to partnership between the two countries in the military sphere to a surrender by Russia of its positions and its loss of the last attribute of a superpower. KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA and IZVESTIYA correspondents asked Army General P. Grachev, Russian defense minister, to share his thoughts on this subject.

[Grachev] I realize that my fellow countrymen may be concerned about the radical strategic offensive arms cuts envisaged by the accords reached in Washington. But I would like to emphasize right away that this decision was not reached on impulse. It was preceded by protracted expert elaboration. A whole series of options for cutting both sides' nuclear potentials was examined.

The key issue at the Russo-U.S. talks continued to be the question of whether the United States is a partner or a rival. We had to convince ourselves that Washington, concerned to safeguard the security of its own country, is not striving for an advantage over Russia. When the presidents arrived at the same views on the fundamental problems of security and safeguarding stability in the world it was possible to rapidly work out joint approaches to strategic offensive arms cuts.

In our assessment, the optimum option was selected, and this formed the basis of the agreements. Of course, it may give rise to ambiguous assessments. But I would note that this option was predetermined by the new political, economic, and, particularly, military relationships emerging both between Russia and the United States and between the former USSR republics. At the same time, I would stress yet again that strategic offensive arms remain the main means of safeguarding Russia's national security and are a guarantee of deterrence against nuclear or conventional war.

[IZVESTIYA] Could you explain why such deep strategic offensive arms cuts were necessary? Were those envisaged by the START Treaty signed by the USSR and the United States really insufficient?

[Grachev] The current strategic nuclear potentials of our two countries considerably exceed the nuclear potentials of Britain, France, and China put together, as well as the requirement of safeguarding national security. Essentially, even after the cuts defined by the START Treaty this picture would not have been fundamentally changed. But the United States could have had an almost twofold advantage in numbers of nuclear warheads [zaryad] when counted realistically [pri ikh realnom zaschete].

We need to bear one other obvious truth in mind—the greater the number of weapons, the greater the burden of expenditure on their upkeep. And, of course, piles of nuclear weapons do not strengthen strategic stability.

[IZVESTIYA] Nonetheless, Pavel Sergeyevich, it seems from the accords reached in Washington that the Americans are keeping their most powerful weapon (submarine-launched missiles) whereas we will have to destroy what we have always prided ourselves on—our land-based heavy missiles. Can it be said that both sides are equally preserving their national interests in the security sphere, and that nobody has made any concessions?

[Grachev] I believe that you are thinking of our former concept of parity, which always boiled down to mandatory quantitative equality in the sides' strategic offensive arms. In my view, this has outlived its usefulness. It could be claimed that even if a side had large quantities of nuclear weapons it would be unlikely to risk using them. There is no need to mention the irreversible consequences that this would entail for all mankind.

One country's security cannot and should not be achieved at the expense of the infringement of another country's security interests. Otherwise both countries would "lose out" from the security standpoint. I am convinced that the question you raised of "concessions" should be approached from this angle.

Like any military man, I am sad to bid farewell to such powerful weapons as heavy MIRVed ICBM's. But those are the realities and requirements of the present day. The fact is that these are the most destabilizing strategic offensive arms. As is well known, a single MIRVed missile can carry up to 10 warheads, but it would take just two or three warheads to destroy the missiles in their silos. So there is a chance that a small number of warheads could destroy a large number of warheads deployed on the other side's MIRVed ICBM's. In a crisis, fear of losing your potential could give rise to the temptation to save MIRVed ICBM's from the threat of attack—in other words, to launch them. This, indeed, is the destabilizing nature of MIRVed ICBM's.

Following the reduction of this type of missile—and it is not only us but the Americans too who are cutting them—the sides will switch to single-warhead ICBM's in their strategic land-based forces. This is a very important point. As is the fact that the process of strategic offensive arms cuts is tied in to observance of the ABM Treaty. If the United States tries to step outside the bounds of this treaty, the accords will immediately lapse.

[IZVESTIYA] Such deep strategic offensive arms cuts will require very considerable spending by both sides. But what "dividends" can we expect as a result?

[Grachev] Of course, from the economic standpoint these cuts in nuclear arsenals will require a considerable amount of spending. But that is just the most obvious aspect. In the foreseeable future this process will lead to a considerable reduction in spending on the upkeep of strategic nuclear forces, and on the development [razrabotka] and production of new missiles. But that is not the end of the matter. Strategic offensive arms cuts will, as you say, pay "dividends" both politically and militarily. After all, implementation of these accords

demonstrates the two countries' desire to prevent a nuclear war. It will give a powerful boost to the further positive development of relations with the United States in all spheres. I think that conditions will be created for moving the nuclear arms reduction process onto a multilateral footing.

As for the military aspect, the implementation of the accords we have reached will ensure the further strengthening of strategic stability. The achievement of a low threshold [porog] for strategic offensive arms makes it possible to reduce the likelihood of unsanctioned missile launches. It will promote the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime. The deep cuts in strategic offensive arms also open up the possibility of cutting and subsequently abandoning nuclear testing for military purposes. All this will ultimately lead to improved guarantees that mankind will successfully avoid nuclear war.

[IZVESTIYA] Incidentally, about nuclear tests. Why was it not possible to break the deadlock on this issue in Washington?

[Grachev] It is well known that this problem was touched upon in Washington. Our position is that we are prepared, along with the other nuclear powers, to immediately examine the question of a comprehensive [vseobyezhushchiy] nuclear test ban.

But we proceed on the basis that nuclear tests in the military sphere have two main aims in principle—to develop [otrabotka] new nuclear warheads and to monitor [proverka] the reliability and safety of existing warheads. If a side has no intention of creating [sоздават] new types of warheads, then there should be no problem in giving up testing in this respect. As for monitoring the reliability and safety of existing nuclear warheads, it seems to me that the sides have already built up sufficient experience. I would like to express the hope that the United States will take all this into account and that the deadlock on the question of a nuclear test ban will be broken.

[IZVESTIYA] To sum up the results of our discussion on the problem of strategic offensive arms cuts—won't the effectiveness of possible retaliation by our strategic nuclear forces be reduced?

[Grachev] Under no circumstances. The calculations done by Russian military scientists show that the figure of 3,000-3,500 warheads is still in excess of the amount required to carry out the Armed Forces' mission. Consequently, if we have effective missile-attack early-warning systems and a reliable battle management system—and we do—then, from a purely military standpoint, we can plan further strategic offensive arms cuts.

Deputy Minister Comments on U.S. Talks

LD2306113992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0840 GMT 23 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jun—The accords on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons, reached by the Russian and U.S. presidents during the official visit of Boris Yeltsin to the United States, are in the interests of both countries. Furthermore, their value lies in the fact that neither of the sides gains any advantage. This was stated today in a conversation with an ITAR-TASS correspondent by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov. The issue at hand is the three-fold reduction of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals by the year 2003—all in all from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000 warheads.

Commenting on the importance of the document signed in Washington, the Russian diplomat noted that the accords that were reached mean "considerable progress." The extent of the reductions in nuclear weapons is twice as large as those envisaged by the old treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Emphasizing the fundamentally new provisions of the Russian-U.S. agreement, he pointed out that it was the first time that limitations on the most powerful component of the U.S. strategic "triad"—naval weapons—had been achieved. According to the deputy minister, it is the first time that a "ceiling" has been introduced for the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles on submarines.

Grigory Berdennikov believes that the Russian-U.S. accords fully reflect the new nature of Russian-U.S. cooperation, where the sides no longer regard each other as enemies, and their relations are shifting to a new basis—from rivalry to cooperation. In this connection, the document signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush permits the elimination of the burden of confrontation of many years which was mainly determined by the amount of mass destruction weapons, said the Russian diplomat. As to certain pessimistic appraisals that express doubt as to the readiness of Russia for such a step, Grigory Berdennikov confirmed once more that all matters had been coordinated with the military leadership of the country and take full account of our possibilities. That is why the extent of and time scales for the reduction of nuclear arsenals determined by the accords are not only substantial but realistic as well.

Arms Cuts Accord With U.S. Criticized

PM2306135192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Jun 92 p 3

[Viktor Nikolayev "Observer's Opinion" "Hope Is the Last Thing To Die"]

[Text] The accords reached in the sphere of nuclear disarmament by George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in Washington last week were sensational in the eyes of many people. It would appear to be the case. A new major breakthrough was indeed made by the two powers to greatly reduce their nuclear arsenals and, consequently, to strengthen mutual security and consolidate world peace.

But at the same time you are also bound to see another "sensation"—once again the Americans have simply duped us at a summit. And, what is more, the Russian side itself did much to ensure that this happened. You get the impression that it joyfully conceded almost all the most important points at the nuclear talks. Even before they began, it had started to stand down its most awesome weapons—the SS-18 heavy missiles, and during the actual talks obligingly bestowed on America manifest superiority in the number of nuclear weapons carried by its aircraft and submarines. The Americans wanted for their own patent advantage to bury the ABM Treaty—at your service, sir. There was no proper bargaining even for the sake of observing the proprieties. And yet this treaty, as military experts remark, has—in terms of a whole number of parameters—been very beneficial in ensuring Russia's security.

As a result of all these strange, not to say large, concessions, the symmetry of the system of equal security, built up through such huge efforts, will be completely destroyed in the most blatant way. And if we dispense with evasive diplomatic language, it is clear that the result of the just-ended talks on nuclear arms reduction represents not just our most dangerous concessions to America, but essentially **capitulation** to it.

You will immediately ask whether we are not by such conclusions whipping up even greater hysteria in our society, which is already worn out by the sharp onslaught of the market and frenzied political fratricide? If there are any doubts on this score, look again at the map of the world. The geopolitical positions of the United States and Russia are quite different. We live surrounded by a countless number of American and NATO military bases, from which any point on our territory could be reached in the twinkling of an eye by ground-, air-, or sea-launched missiles, without their even resorting to those nuclear systems based on U.S. territory proper.

How and with what will we respond if this happens? Will we be strong enough? That's the crux of it. We are burying with the greatest joy our own ground-launched ICBM's with multiple warheads. In our headlong rush to a market economy our tattered nuclear ships and submarines would, if we can find the fuel for them, still try to get through to their target through the powerful, multilayered American search-and-destroy system. Do not forget either about SDI here, which we, on our own initiative, were about to help the Americans improve.

I recently contacted certain generals and other officers who belong to the command and control structures of the

strategic nuclear forces and who took part to a greater or lesser extent in the preparation of the "truly historic" documents I wanted to discover why we actually made the concessions? Perhaps this is some highly sophisticated game beyond the ken of ordinary folk? My interlocutors, who expressed—to a man—the desire to remain anonymous, for, as one of them said, "I don't want to become a pensioner the next time your newspaper comes out," were unanimous that cuts must be made, but not so recklessly.

"By this agreement," my interlocutor said, "we have wrecked, not strengthened, strategic stability, the most important principle of equal security!"

"But who prevented your saying all this aloud even before the visit to Washington?" I asked.

"Don't be naive," he replied. "You know what the upshot would be. In such situations you are constantly having to choose between your conscience and your job. Two colleagues of mine, for example, were instructed to expeditiously prepare a document which 'would convincingly demonstrate' that we had made no concessions to the Americans. And what happened, then? One 'promptly fell ill,' while the other begged to be sent on an assignment..."

I still cherish the hope that during the ratification of the capitulatory agreements in the Russian Supreme Soviet, its members will make solid efforts to determine why it was that the president, who publicly promised before his departure for Washington to make no concessions to America, suddenly delivered such a slap in the face to his own people when there?

Hope, as is well known, is the last thing to die.

Shaposhnikov Assesses Arms Control Agreement

LD2306180592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1510 GMT 23 Jun 92

[Text] The recent strategic arms deal between Moscow and Washington gives a renewed impetus to nuclear disarmament by the Commonwealth of Independent States on the central issue in military relations within the entity. Earlier, CIS heads of state agreed for all nuclear weapons to be transferred to Russia by 1994 for subsequent destruction under joint control. The commander in chief of the Commonwealth forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, explains what changes have taken place since.

Marshal Shaposhnikov says summit talks in Alma-Ata and Minsk failed to take into account the huge cost of weapons transfer to Russia. In his view this must be made first part [as heard] of the arms cuts agreement reached by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush for two main reasons. First is the economic considerations, and the second, the naming of the year 2000 as the deadline for nuclear weapons destruction.

We asked Marshal Shaposhnikov what he makes of the new strategic arms agreement reached in Washington

Because of the remaining difficulties on the Russian side Marshal Shaposhnikov described it as an agreement of intent for the time being. He said the bulk of the Commonwealth nuclear stockpile was ground-based and stationary, compared with America's which was sea-launched and mobile. But he spoke of the need for further work to see that there is no damage to either side's security. Marshal Shaposhnikov agrees there is no alternative to disarmament, but wants parity, he said that 50 years of posturing had been damaging to the country's economy, but he warned against all-out, reckless disarmament, calling for reason and for careful calculations to be made first. We asked him was it true that the Washington deal had been struck behind the back of the military.

Marshal Shaposhnikov said that all of that came under lengthy discussion both by the CIS Chief Command and Russia's Defense Ministry, which explains why the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Andrey Kozyrev, was so tough at the negotiations in Washington and London. The marshal raised the possibility that President Yeltsin must have found a way for compromise and that it was up to the military to finalize the agreement.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Krasnoyarsk Radar Station To Undergo Conversion

LD1706204692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1808 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Moscow June 17 ITAR-TASS—The Government of the Russian Federation has ordered to turn to peaceful economic uses the structures that remained after the dismantling of the former Krasnoyarsk radio location station. The government proceeded from the statement of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces that its commandment had suspended the dismantling of the transmitter and receiver blocks of the former Krasnoyarsk radar station and was considering their transfer to the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry.

The Fuel and Energy Ministry has been instructed to prepare, jointly with the administration of the Krasnoyarsk territory, all the necessary documents to reequip the remaining buildings to house a furniture factory and other production facilities for turning out consumer goods. These documents will thereafter be passed over to the American side.

The Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry, on agreement with the Foreign Ministry, the Russian Security Ministry and the Supreme Commandment of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, will organize, in conformity with an accord with the U.S. side, a visit of U.S. representatives to the former radar station. All the expenses will be covered by the American side. Any further requests for similar trips by Americans will be organised on similar terms.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has been instructed to inform the U.S. side about the suspension of the dismantling of the former radio location station and about the readiness of the Russian side to organize visits, as well as to pass over to Americans documents concerning the refurbishing of the Krasnoyarsk radar station.

Russian-American Statement On Global Defense System

LD1806143192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1025 GMT 18 Jun 92

[“Joint Russian-American Statement on Global Defense System”—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] [No dateline as received] The presidents continued discussion of the potential advantages of a global defense system against ballistic missiles and agreed that it is important to study the role of defense in protecting against limited ballistic missile strikes. Both presidents agreed that their two countries should work together with their allies and other interested states with the aim of elaborating a concept for such a system as part of a common strategy with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation will be a tangible expression of the new relations which exist between Russia and the United States and will involve them in an important undertaking together with other countries of the world community.

The two presidents agreed on the need to start the elaboration of a concept of a global defense system without delay. With this aim they agreed to create a high-level group to study the following practical steps as a matter of priority

—the potential for exchanging information in the sphere of early warning by way of setting up an early warning center.

—the potential for cooperation with participating states in the elaboration of the means and technologies for defense from ballistic missiles.

—the elaboration of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements, and possible amendments of existing treaties and agreements, necessary for the implementation of a global defense system.

Signed in Washington on 17 June 1992 in two copies—each in the Russian and English languages—both texts having equal force.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Military 'Regrets' SS-23 Elimination

Official on INF Treaty Implementation

OW 1806/02492 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1845 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Report by A. Ostrovskiy video; from the "Utro" program]

[Text] It is symbolic that the first official visit by the Russian president to the United States of America coincides with what appears to us to be another important date. Our military correspondent, Aleksandr Ostrovskiy, tells us about it. [video shows a convoy of trucks carrying missiles, helicopters flying cover, cranes unloading missiles, explosives being positioned, and detonations]

[Begin video recording] [Ostrovskiy] It is the fourth anniversary since the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] came into force and laid the foundation for real disarmament. In a year and a half, shorter-range missiles and their launching equipment have been eliminated. The funds for their destruction came from the sale of metal from auto chassis and the missile cannisters. Incidentally, through stupidity by the leadership of the country, one cannot say otherwise, at the same time they also destroyed the unique operational-tactical OTR-23 Oka, known in the United States as the SS-23. The Oka, which has a range of up to 400 km, did not come under the terms of the treaty. [video cuts to show Ostrovskiy interviewing Colonel V. B. Leshchenko, chief of the center for ensuring the implementation of the treaty]

Why is there a need for your center if the missiles have been destroyed?

[Leshchenko] In accordance with the INF Treaty, verifiable objects specified in the memorandum are subject to inspection until the year 2001. One of the tasks of the center is to maintain the verifiable objects in a constant state of readiness for inspection activities by U.S. inspection groups. [video shows document listing quantities of military weapons by military districts and regions]

At present, our basic task is the preparation of ground troops to fulfill the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces. With the disintegration of the USSR, it seems to me to be necessary to review the legal basis of acceptance by the newly formed independent states of U.S. inspection groups monitoring the implementation of the treaty on objects in their territory. For now, Russia is bearing the brunt of the costs. [video cuts to show a group of soldiers in formation, soldiers placing charges on top of missiles, and detonations]

[Ostrovskiy] It remains to be added that out of 41 verifiable objects, 26 are on the territory of near-neighbor states such as the Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, and Central Asia. The U.S. inspection group is arriving today to verify the objects, and accordingly, their travel is paid for by Russia. [end recording]

I will add that a conference on the implementation of international treaties on disarmament is opening at the Russian Ground Forces main headquarters

Asserts SS-23 Not Limited by Treaty

LD 1706223192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Correspondent A. Ostrovskiy report; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Americans promise us their help in disarmament, we need money and special centers. Here is a unique documentary by our missile specialists on what the elimination of missiles looks like

[Ostrovskiy] It already has been four years since the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] came into force. It marked the beginning of the real process of disarmament. Over a period of a year and a half shorter-range missiles, launchers, and the means of transport for them have been eliminated in respect of the Ground Troops. The sale of metals, automobile chassis, and missile canisters have made it practically possible to compensate for the outlay on the process of eliminating them

[Begin recording: V. B. Leshchenko, chief of the center for ensuring implementation of the treaty] At present, the main task is to prepare the Ground Troops to fulfill the treaty on reducing conventional armed forces. [video shows convoy of missile carriers on the move, charges being placed into missiles, an explosion, military official speaking] [end recording]

Incidentally, in line with our habit of doing things in a sweeping manner, during the last stage of disarmament we destroyed unique OTR-23 Oka [SS-23] operational-tactical missiles that have a range of up to 400 km. The military, which knows about missiles, regrets this very much and says that the OTR-23 Oka missiles did not come under the treaty

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Withdrawal From Latvia 'Should Be' Considered by ICJ

OW 1206160592 Moscow BALTIC in English 1448 GMT 12 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy of the European Parliament Ole Espersen who is in Riga now said during his talks with Vice-Chairman of the Latvian parliament Valdis Birkavs that the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvia should be considered by the International Court of Justice [ICJ].

Birkavs told BF [BALTFAX] that the appeal to the International Court of Justice dealing with the occupational regime in Latvia had been drafted even before the August putsch. Latvia was not a member of the UN, though.

Birkavs believes that Russia attaches greater importance to its strategic interests than to inter-governmental agreements. He illustrated his statement by quoting leader of the Russian delegation to the talks with Latvia Sergey Zотов, who said that Russia will not withdraw its troops from Latvia during two years, even if all the necessary facilities are built for its servicemen in Russia.

Further Reports On Lithuanian Referendum

Landsbergis 'Pleased' With Outcome

LD1506221192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 15 Jun 92

[News conference held in Vilnius Supreme Council Hall attended and addressed by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis and Vlado Litvinas, head of the Lithuanian Electoral Commission, including question and answer session; moderated by Darius Silas—live]

[Text] [Words indistinct] referendum, concerning the withdrawal of the former USSR Army from Lithuania, and also concerning Esteemed Landsbergis' trip to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. I shall first yield the floor to Esteemed Litvinas and then to the Supreme Council chairman. Please reserve your questions for the period following the speeches of both the participants. Esteemed Litvinas please begin.

[Litvinas] [Words indistinct] According to the data obtained by the Republic Electoral Commission based upon city and rayon referendum commissions' protocols, we can already report to you on the preliminary results [words indistinct] the general number of voters eligible to vote in the referendum which took place yesterday on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania amounts to 2,540,043 Lithuanian citizens. Of those, 1,924,328 turned out to vote in the referendum. This comprises 75.76 percent. Those who answered yes to the question presented in the referendum amounted to 1,744,135, which equals 90.76 percent of those who turned out. The no answer was selected by 140,051 citizens, or approximately 7 percent of the number of those who turned out. The number of ballots adjudged as invalid equals 37,500—1.95 percent.

The final number of those in favor of the referendum assertion, taking into account the general number of voters, currently amounts to 68.67 percent. The number

of those who stated no, taking into account the general number of voters, comprises 5.51 percent from the general number of voters. To date, we do not have information on the voting results in the referendum districts which have been set up in the embassies and consular offices of the Republic of Lithuania in foreign countries. This completes the statistical data

[Silas] Thank you. I would now like to invite the Supreme Council chairman to speak

[Landsbergis] I think we can all be pleased with the referendum results. It was very important to verify whether the people understand the importance of participating in a referendum of this type, since certain opinions were being spread that perhaps this referendum is not all that necessary, that its goal is not very clear. Moreover, special attempts were made at misleading the people, even up to the last days. Here a certain not very characteristic duck was released by Moscow Television to disturb people's minds. There were other such matters. Therefore, we can be pleased with the fact that the people did manage to discern, within the current situation and in Lithuania's historical missions and problems, our requests—those of the Lithuanian State leaders and also of the negotiation delegation, and of all those who carry out the foreign policy—for people to support, through their votes, this policy with strict demands to withdraw the foreign army very speedily. To be specific, this year. The people understood and gave us additional arguments in support of this political job

For us (?the) referendum results could not be based on guesswork, that which we were carrying out—we the individuals who hold within our hands this foreign policy and the questions of the army withdrawal—inasmuch as that is dependent on us. Thus also, in recent days we had to work [words indistinct], since it was mentioned here that the Rio de Janeiro conference will also be touched upon at the news conference, undoubtedly its contents are known to the international press.

One of the functions of our delegation at the Rio conference was to participate, to discuss, and to speak out. I also gave a report at the plenary session of the conference and had to sign [word indistinct] convention, which I have signed on behalf of Lithuania. But I also had no fewer than 11 official meetings with state leaders. For the most part these were meetings organized by the Supreme Council chairmen of all of the three Baltic states, and some visits as well by the presidents of other states, or else meetings with prime ministers.

Among such important meetings can be included a significant conversation with German Chancellor Kohl, with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, and with President of Argentina Menem. I am not going to list all of them—with Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky, and President of Hungary Goncz, etc. I had a very sincere conversation with the prime minister of India. Everywhere, we raised as the most important question the withdrawal of the foreign army from the Baltic states, and the quest for

such international political support was met everywhere with great benevolence and, let us say, a promise or a determination of support in international forums and in various high level meetings.

Thus, that which is transpiring in Lithuania, this referendum, the vote and our diplomatic and political efforts in international forums and meetings do coincide.

I think that this summer we will have to answer this question in a principal fashion. Does the withdrawal of the Russian Army really begin in a visible and tangible manner, in large numbers, and from the most important areas of deployment, such as the 107th Division in Vilnius? Of course, with clarification provided on why an army made up of strictly an assault force continues to be deployed in the Baltic states, and whose presence here has nothing in common with any sort of Russian defensive interests. Moreover, this question is currently in truth not a question raised by us. It is included in the agenda of many [word indistinct] as for instance, the future meeting of the Helsinki Summit Meeting in July, and it is very good that the citizens of Lithuania with their vote have also expressed a very firm and clear will.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Chairman, could you possibly tell us in more detail about the type of assistance that was promised by German Chancellor Kohl [word indistinct]?

[Landsbergis] Currently, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told me that he himself will raise this question in Lisbon and Munich, especially at the citizens' [word indistinct] meeting in Munich, and also in his meeting with Boris Yeltsin. He was interested to learn what the motives for the non-withdrawal are, how we ourselves assess them, and whether the statements regarding social needs and the shortage of apartments are the principal reason. Moreover, all three of us [Baltic leaders] told him that in our estimation this does not constitute the principal reason, it is more of a pretext.

We have invited Mr. Kohl to pay us a visit, to visit our countries. He has accepted this invitation, and a time will be agreed upon [word-indistinct].

[INTERFAX correspondent] Mr. Chairman, could you comment on one figure [words indistinct], namely that approximately one-fourth of the voters—approximately 28 percent—did not say yes. They have either stayed away or else a small percentage said yes, thus in your estimation is this a large percentage or a small one, and how do you assess this [words indistinct]?

[Landsbergis] I think this constitutes a rather normal percentage of passive citizens. I would by no means regard this in the fashion of some making an assessment in the earlier referendum, that those who are passive are in truth active. Because one who is passive is passive. Whoever wanted to, came, voted, said no, and expressed himself in opposition, otherwise all sorts of reasons arise about why people simply failed to vote. It does not mean that their opinion is particularly negative.

[Unidentified correspondent] Esteemed chairman, have you had a meeting with President of Poland Walesa?

[Landsbergis] Are you asking about R.P.? I have not completely understood your question.

[Correspondent] It was announced that you would meet in Poland with President Walesa.

[Landsbergis] Oh, I did not hear your question. No, this meeting has not yet taken place. It was not ready to be agreed upon. It was being coordinated as a sort of possibility, because I was to return by way of Warsaw and did indeed return through Warsaw. However, as you know, the situation is very complicated in Poland, and yesterday as a matter of fact, the Solidarity conference was taking place in Gdansk. Besides, President Walesa was a participant there, thus such a possibility was very remote and [word indistinct] it was not fulfilled, and it would not have been accomplished because also of either [word indistinct], since the plane I travelled across the Atlantic on was late and I missed the plane I was supposed to take to Warsaw. Consequently we spent a very long time at Madrid Airport. [Word indistinct] I only returned to Lithuania overnight. Therefore, this meeting would have fallen through even if it had been planned. Another time, perhaps.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS correspondent] I would like to ask Mr. Litvinas when the final results of the 23 May referendum will be [word indistinct].

[Litvinas] The 23 May results are now at the republican electoral commission. They have been confirmed, and everything, including the results of 14 June, will be submitted together [Words indistinct] during that period, since there were many complaints we have been examining them—you are well aware of that. We are trying to make sure that no kind of violation of the referendum law remains unnoticed, so that all the complaints are dealt with.

[Unidentified correspondent in English] Mr. Chairman, what concrete steps will you do to force the ex-Soviet Army out of Lithuania? I also thought about the...[changes thought] Mr. Mitterrand recently said that said that 1992 deadline would be unrealistic.

[Landsbergis] It is of great importance to us that our position is universally known and that it is reflected in certain international relations, or principles of state relations. Perhaps the type of situation which now exists in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has never existed before, namely that the army of a former occupying state remains in the occupied countries, even after that state ceases to exist.

This is like a hammer without an owner who knows what it can be capable of. Previously, we were very concerned and raised this question to the status of an international issue, because an army which is not subordinated to any constitutional or civil administration is a particularly

dangerous thing. Currently, this army is formally subordinate to Russia—the Russian civilian administration—a law-based, constitutional administration.

However, we are not always sure whether the army is entirely subordinate. Thus, there are two aspects of our demand for its withdrawal: one concerns Russia's responsibility, the other concerns the international responsibility for the situation in the entire Baltic region.

It must be made totally clear who is issuing orders to whom and who is responsible for what. However, if this is not an armed force that is not being controlled and is dangerous, some kind of counterbalance must be created for it. At the very least, international attention must be paid. International organizations must set up some kind of control, some system of monitoring, some fact-finding commissions. Various mechanisms exist that can be utilized to make sure that this army is being disciplined, because its behavior in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is dangerous.

Its presence is one matter, and its behavior another. In both instances, we wish to see a very clear position on the part of Russia and some international support. International demand will help to clearly define that position and to obtain the results I have mentioned.

A clearly visible withdrawal—the start of this withdrawal—would constitute specific results. I discussed this with President Yeltsin during our meeting in Moscow. He was of the same opinion, that a clear start must be made.

[Unidentified correspondent] Is it possible to consider that yesterday's referendum provides the basis for this in the event of Lithuania refusing in July to sign the Helsinki Declaration on Security, along with the state whose army is deployed on its territory? Apparently, such an idea was voiced by the Estonians some time ago.

[Landsbergis] There are some thoughts of this nature in existence as you know, but this does not constitute Lithuania's position alone. This is the demand of the three Baltic states, and it makes it possible to influence the Helsinki process prior to the Helsinki meeting. I think we will resolve this question together—all three countries—despite the fact that there was no referendum in Latvia and Estonia, but there was one in Lithuania. However, our referendum helps and fortifies the common position, too.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, are there any plans for joint action by the three Baltic States to encourage a Russian withdrawal following the referendum—any sort of joint action involving all three Baltic States?

[Landsbergis] We have common political actions, all the time, even in Rio De Janeiro. We have met and prepared a joint document—a joint statement by the leaders of

three states—which will be disseminated at the United Nations, and it could also be provided for you here. It was announced yesterday.

The most important position here, is this—I can read one paragraph for you: The three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, are convinced that the army of one CSCE member state may not be deployed on another CSCE state's territory without the latter state's consent.

This statement concerns the states participating in the Helsinki Accord process and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Our text also says Should this happen, it would be tantamount to armed coercion and intervention. It would undermine the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki process.

We consider this to be a matter of principle, in our case in particular, but also for state relations in general, and we believe that this should obtain some support.

[Unidentified correspondent] [Question indistinct]

[Landsbergis] It was a pleasure to meet with the Argentine president and to thank him for his support in our struggle to regain our independence, since in one sense he was an initiator—Argentina was the first Latin American country to recognize our restored independence. Moreover, when we told him of our most important current concerns, President Menem stated that he will support this position of ours in all forums and in all organizations. He fully comprehends that our countries do not yet have full independence. While the army is not withdrawn we are constrained, our security is not assured, and this must be resolved.

I was able to ask him—I was pleased to note that in Argentina, a commercial Argentina-Lithuania building has been established in Buenos Aires—to encourage bilateral trade and other economic relations. I asked him to give it more impetus by devoting some of his attention to that institution. I also discussed a specific question, namely the supply of grain from Argentina and Argentine state credits for this. The Argentine president stated that this is entirely within the realm of possibility. We also exchanged official invitations for official visits.

[LIETUVOS RYTAS correspondent] I would like to ask when a meeting with the Russian president is planned. Do you know whether he has been informed of the referendum results, and, if he has been advised of them, what his reactions were?

[Landsbergis] I don't know. Perhaps the information was passed on today. I haven't asked him, after all. I don't quite understand your question. When is a meeting planned? No more was said about it—we haven't agreed on any specific date or meeting. We have a verbal agreement that, should some problem crop up—or at least should matters fail to progress—we will maintain contact by telephone. If necessary we will hold further meetings, but without any specific date.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, you said earlier that the social problems are only a pretext. What are the real reasons for the Soviet Army's [word indistinct]?

[Landsbergis] This was the common opinion of the parliamentary chairmen of the three Baltic countries. We understand that certain problems, problems in relocation, do exist, but it is also our experience that the Russian side is not really attempting to do anything about this problem, or is even avoiding it entirely.

We have asked them many times to provide us with either lists or statistics on the number of families of these officers, where they would like to relocate, where houses should be built, and things of that nature. Perhaps there could be an opportunity for exchanges, or some sort of compensation, or even the kind of construction assistance we have been promised by the Scandinavian countries.

However, to be able to view the matter in a specific light, one needs specificity from the other side. Since we have not obtained a single name of a single family, or any sort of number, we are coming to the conclusion that this is just something the Russians have thought up in order to have something to say. Moreover, they are making no great efforts, nor are they even displaying any great desire, to resolve, and to resolve quickly, the officers' relocation problem. A similar conclusion is being drawn in Latvia and Estonia.

I can also add, in case no one has noticed, that I have taken [word indistinct] my own initiative on this, and have tasked the Ministry of Defense to gather some data from the Russian officers now living in Lithuania by using a kind of poll. How do they envision their relocation? What sort of compensation would they like to obtain? Which Russian regions they would like to move to?

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, if housing is not the problem, what is?

[Landsbergis] I think the real problem, if we can describe it as such, is a political one. It seems that the Russian military leaders want to preserve their position here. Perhaps they have not yet abandoned their old idea that there is a hostile world around the Soviet Union and that the best defense against this hostile world is to expand their territory or spheres of influence. It seems quite difficult to change this way of thinking, and to get them to realize that we need zones of peace, friendship, and good cooperation around us, and not zones of military presence.

It is quite possible to imagine that leaders who think like this would like to keep their troops here as a kind of obstacle to our economic liberation and all-round contacts with the Western world, because the troops' presence here is a great obstacle to investments. When we do not have sufficiently developed cooperation with other countries, in investment and so on, we are economically

restricted and therefore more dependent on Russia. This kind of political motive could exist as well.

There may also be a psychological motive, possibly due to a sense of uncertainty. Perhaps some ex-CPSU political forces think that if the troops remain here, they could perhaps render assistance if the former Soviet Communist Party returned to power, and could help bring the whole of the former Soviet Union under its control.

[Unidentified correspondent] Commenting on the referendum. Moscow television said yesterday that the results would give Lithuania a trump card in the negotiations. Do you think the results of the referendum in the Ignalina, Salcininkai, and Vilnius regions will perhaps give Moscow certain advantages in the negotiations?

[Landsbergis] There has always been speculation and there always will be. What matter to us, however, is the main result and not that of some individual area, be it Salcininkai, Pakruojis, or any other.

[Silas] The chairman's agenda is rather full, so two more questions please.

[Unidentified correspondent] Esteemed chairman, what is your assessment of the recent promotion given to Mironov, the former group commander of the North West Armed Forces?

[Landsbergis] I am not sure if I should guess about this. The fact that Mironov was here in Riga and in Vilnius on more than one occasion, that we are acquainted with him, that we managed to reach an agreement on some things, as for example in the case of Colonel Chernykh, and that his promotion means that in Moscow he will be nearer to the places where even more important decisions are made, may perhaps sometimes help our negotiators to find a better understanding. We are acquaintances after all.

[Unidentified correspondent] Have the Russians mentioned any other problem besides building houses for the withdrawing servicemen?

[Landsbergis] Officially only this pretext has been raised. However, sometimes they mentioned anti-aircraft strategic matters, saying that it would not be easy for Russia to restructure them quickly. However, no specific question has been raised. On the contrary, we note that when the Russian military leadership decides to make a show of apparently withdrawing a small group of servicemen, it is a small part of the antiaircraft defenses that are withdrawn, and not, say, paratroops, which are the most dangerous assault troops. Therefore in this respect there are contradictions, and we cannot guess what is behind them. Perhaps the time will come when concrete talk can begin. We have wanted all this time to start real talk concerning the timetable for the withdrawal of the troops—which units will be withdrawn, when, and from where. Unfortunately, at the moment we cannot say this.

[Silas] I would like to thank Chairman Landsbergis and [word indistinct] as well as the television viewers and the journalists.

Results Issued

LD1506161792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1458 GMT 15 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsilas]

[Text] Vilnius June 15 TASS—"Lithuania's residents gave us an additional argument to demand that the Army of the former Soviet Union be withdrawn from Lithuania in 1992," Lithuanian Parliament Leader Vytautas Landsbergis said summing up the results of a referendum on the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the Army in the current year and compensation for the damage caused to Lithuania. The poll was held in the republic on June 14.

Lithuanian Election Commission Deputy Chairman Vaclovas Litvinas acquainted journalists in greater detail with the tentative results of the referendum. He said almost two million people or some 76 percent of eligible citizens took part in the vote. Almost 91 percent of the participants in the ballot favoured pulling out troops immediately and compensating for the damage wrought, some seven percent put "no" on their ballot papers and about two percent of the ballot papers appeared to be invalid for being wrongly marked.

About 69 percent of all citizens of the Lithuanian republic, who were registered as participants in the referendum, voted in favour of moving the Army out and some 5.5 percent of eligible voters—were against.

Landsbergis, speaking about the results of the referendum, expressed the view that this summer should reveal if Russia really begins withdrawing large numbers of troops from major places of their deployment, first and foremost Vilnius.

"It is necessary that a specific talk on the Army withdrawal timetable be begun," Landsbergis emphasised. He thinks the Russian side's attempts to explain the delay by difficulties involved in the provision of servicemen and their family members with housing is not grounded enough. He supported this statement with the argument that the requirements for housing and specific wishes have not yet been named despite repeated requests.

Landsbergis expressed the view that the delay with the withdrawal was caused by "political reasons" and also "the Russian military leadership's desire to preserve their positions in Lithuania as long as possible."

Landsbergis voiced the supposition that "the firm and unequivocal will of Lithuania's residents" can help solve the issues involved in the withdrawal of the Army of the former USSR from the Baltic states at the forthcoming Helsinki conference. He spoke out for international organisations to pay more attention to this process.

In Landsbergis's view, the results of last Sunday's [14 June] referendum in Lithuania "will bolster the Baltic states' uniform stance".

Four Rayons Vote 'No'

PM2206114792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Lithuania Votes In Favor of the Withdrawal of Russian Troops"]

[Text] Vilnius—A referendum was held in Lithuania Sunday [14 June], in which the republic's citizens expressed their attitude to the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania.

On the eve of the referendum, the republic's mass media unleashed a large-scale propaganda campaign to win the support of the electorate. Lithuanian Television broadcast a recording of a speech by V. Landsbergis, who is at the environmental conference in Rio de Janeiro. The head of the parliament called on all citizens to vote in favor of the unconditional and urgent withdrawal of troops. "The Russian troops' place is in Russia, they have nothing to do in Lithuania," he stressed harshly. All political forces in Lithuania—which have until now been sharp rivals in the fight for political leadership—are without exception committed to this opinion.

Major organizational measures have also been undertaken to attract as many voters as possible to the 2,150 polling stations operating in the republic.

The preliminary results of the referendum have become known.

A total of 75.76 percent of citizens from the total number of voters presented themselves at the polling stations in operation in Lithuania. Of these, 90.76 percent expressed their support for the urgent and unconditional withdrawal of troops this year and compensation for the damage. Calculating it in terms of the total electoral roll, 68.67 people in Lithuania demanded that the troops be immediately withdrawn.

However, according to the same preliminary information, which evidently has yet to be finalized, the results in four of the republic's rayons proved inauspicious for the Lithuanian authorities. The demand to withdraw the troops was supported by less than 50 percent of the electorate in Ignalinskiy, Vilniusskiy, Shalchininkaskiy, and Trakayskiy Rayons. Let me remind readers that these are the areas with a dense foreign-language-speaking population, and that three of them have a so-called administrative rule system (notably Ignalinskiy Rayon in the nuclear power industry workers' city of Sniechus). According to certain observers, this result in the ballot in the rayons in question testifies to the fact that many Russians, and indeed Poles, living in Lithuania who do not object to

the logical demand to withdraw the troops, are dissatisfied with the categorical nature of this demand—the withdrawal of the army this year.

The final results of the referendum will apparently become known Wednesday. A more detailed analysis of the results of the nationwide ballot is in store, but the first comments by leading Lithuanian politicians are optimistic. The firm conviction is being expressed that the results of the referendum will have enormous political significance, since they will become a weighty argument at talks with Russia and also at international conferences where Lithuania can now appeal to the world community with full authority using the positive results of the referendum.

European Leaders Pledge Aid on Baltic Troop Withdrawal

*OW1706143492 Moscow BALTEAX in English
1352 GMT 17 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] European leaders meeting with the head of the Estonian parliament Arnold Ruutel during the recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro are said to have pledged assistance in internationalizing the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states.

Ruutel speaking at a news conference on Tuesday [16 June] said that the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, believed the presence of Russian troops in the Baltic states was of an immediate threat to their security and as such, their status was different from that in Germany. The Chancellor promised to raise the issue of troop withdrawals at the coming G-7 summit and to link the question of western aid with Russia's practical moves in that direction. Ruutel said that Germany had also agreed to finance the programmes for early troop withdrawals.

The possibility of raising the issue at the forthcoming Helsinki conference was also discussed with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. The Estonian leader also held talks with the president of Iceland, Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, to try to secure Iceland's help in resolving the issue.

Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt re-stated his intention to meet with the Balts before the Helsinki forum to discuss the international aspects of Russia's pullout from the region. Hungarian President Árpád Göncz had also expressed support to the leaders of the Baltic states.

Withdrawal To Be Key Issue at Baltic Council

Landsbergis Comments

*LD2106211992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2019 GMT 21 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazys Ustisla]

[Text] Vilnius June 22 TASS—The demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states will be the key issue at the upcoming session of the Baltic Council opening in Tallinn on June 26, Lithuanian parliamentary Speaker Vytautas Landsbergis said on Sunday [21 June].

Landsbergis said the participants will sign several documents, including an appeal to the G-7 summit meeting in Munich which will discuss the economic and political situation in Europe and assistance to Russia.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said during his visit to Rio de Janeiro that he intends to raise the question of state security of the Baltic states and the withdrawal of troops from their territory, Landsbergis said.

Speaking on Russian troops' activities in Moldova and Georgia, Landsbergis described Russia's statements that it "will protect Russians in other countries" as "very dangerous" and likened them to the "activities of Nazi Germany, which also said it would protect every German in every country."

"The sooner Russia pulls out its troops the better will Russians living in Lithuania feel." He warned that "Russians may be identified with this Army," which "causes tension and conflict situations and illegally distributes weapons" in Lithuania.

Comments Further

*LD2206094992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0935 GMT 22 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazys Ustisla]

[Text] Vilnius, June 22 TASS—The demand that the army be moved out of the Baltic States and the encouragement of this withdrawal will be the main subject of discussion at a meeting of the Baltic States' Council in Tallinn on June 26. Lithuanian parliament Chief Vytautas Landsbergis said appearing on the republican television on Sunday [21 June] evening.

Landsbergis said documents due to be signed at the meeting are being prepared under an agreement by the leaders of all three Baltic States' parliaments. The key document among them should be an appeal to the 'big nine' which, according to Landsbergis, will discuss problems of economic and political life in Europe and also aid to Russia at its next meeting in Munich.

Landsbergis added that during his stay in Rio de Janeiro German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke about the intention to raise the issue of the Baltic States' security and the mandatory withdrawal of the Army from their territory at the group of nine states' meeting.

Landsbergis devoted much attention to the theme which he formulated as "the Russian Army beyond Russia's boundaries". Speaking about the Army's actions and role in Moldova and Georgia and also about "repeated statements that Russia will defend Russians in other

countries", he described them as "very dangerous". Moreover, he drew historical parallels between this situation and "the conduct of Nazi Germany which at one time also stated that it would defend each German in each country."

"The sooner the Army is moved out, the more useful this will be for Russians residing in Lithuania," Landsbergis said motivating his conclusion by the prediction that "Russians can begin to be identified with this Army", which, he said, "creates tension, conflicts and covertly distributes weapons" in Lithuania.

Lithuania Wants Troop Issue Included in CSCE

OW2206224092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1809 GMT 22 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuania will seek to have the issue of the withdrawal of formerly Soviet troops from the Baltics included in the final document of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which will be held July 9-10. The timetable of the withdrawal will be offered by Lithuania, while Russia will have to strictly follow it, head of the Lithuanian delegation for the conference Valdemaras Katkus told the republican radio.

In his opinion, the results of the June 14 referendum on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania in 1992 would be "of great help" in that issue.

Byelarus Presidium Approves Forces Treaty, Protocols

LD2206193292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1413 GMT 22 Jun 92

[By BELTA correspondent Vladimir Glod for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, 22 Jun—Byelarus is ready to fulfill all the obligations arising from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as soon as it comes into force. This is the keynote of a letter sent today on behalf of Byelarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich to all countries participating in the Treaty.

A Byelarusian Supreme Soviet Presidium decision served as grounds for the message. Presidium members met in a special sitting late on 20 June and approved the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and protocols to it. The agreement on the principles of and procedure for applying the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the protocols to it, signed on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent, were approved at the same time.

A Byelarusian parliament press service representative told BELTA that the Presidium, in adopting the decision to approve the Treaty, proceeded from the fact that the

question of ratification of these documents would be examined at the next session of the Republic's Supreme Soviet.

EBRD To Help Baltics Arrange Troop Withdrawal

OW2206224192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1809 GMT 22 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] will help the Baltics arrange the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories. The agreement was reached by the Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian leaders and representatives of the EBRD at the international symposium "European House—New Architecture of Europe" in Switzerland last week. One of the main topics of the symposium was integration of the Baltics in the European structures.

Russia Not 'Entirely Prepared' To Implement CFE

PM2206192392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 3

[Unidentified own correspondent report: "Problems for Disarmament People Too"]

[Text] A conference dedicated to questions of the implementation of the CFE Treaty on Russian Federation territory in the light of its forthcoming ratification by the Supreme Soviet has been held at the Ground Forces Main Staff. An analysis by collectives at the Ground Forces' center for ensuring the implementation of treaties and in the relevant departments at military district and group of forces directorates shows that the state is not entirely prepared [svidetelstvuyet o nepolnoy gotovnosti gosudarstva] for the implementation of the main aspects of the CFE Treaty. The problems relate, in particular, to inspections of Russian troops located outside Russian territory, in its "hot spots," with regard to the weapons held there.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Arzamas-16 Begins Nuclear Weapons Destruction

92UM1191A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IMA-press: "Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine Are to be Eliminated"]

[Text] Arzamas-16 has begun the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons.

The arrival of a group of observers is expected from Ukraine and they are to make certain that the weapons are actually destroyed and not mothballed.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Parliamentary Committees To Discuss Novaya Zemlya

LD1606184792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] The Ecological and Defense Committees of the Russian Parliament will hold a joint meeting today to discuss the problem of nuclear tests on the Archipelago Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean. They are to work out recommendations to be submitted to parliament. After the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test ground where the former Soviet Union carried out explosions in military and civilian purposes, the test field on the Novaya Zemlya is the only one Russia has now. Many experts believe, however, the continuation of nuclear tests there constitutes a serious threat to the ecology of near Arctic regions.

'Crucial' Pause in Nuclear Testing Urged

PM1706113192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 92 First Edition p 5

[Commentary under "Ecology" rubric by Aleksandr Veshnyakov, member of the Russian Supreme Soviet; Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov of the "Toward a New Land" movement; and Vladimir Yakimets of the Russian Academy of Sciences Systems Analysis Institute and the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement: "Traffic Signal on Amber"]

[Text] Scorning public opinion, nuclear weapons developers in the United States and China are pressing ahead with perfecting state-of-the-art systems. Russian nuclear physicists are attending the tests in the capacity of observers, thereby demonstrating professional-clan solidarity, although they explain it as concern for our security.

Five nuclear powers and five nuclear test sites...As of today, three test sites have fallen silent: Semipalatinsk, for good; Novaya Zemlya and Mururoa, temporarily. The two remaining test sites—in Nevada, where the United States and Great Britain carry out tests, and near Lake Lop Nur in China—will not be closed for the time being.

The last three months have been characterized by heightened activity at these two test sites. The United States has already carried out two of the five tests planned for 1992, and the third is scheduled for June. If we plot on this graph the explosion of roughly 1 megaton yield carried out by the Chinese 21 May, then what becomes apparent is unconcealed haste, an effort "to jump" the amber light at a nuclear intersection blocked by public opinion before the political traffic signal shows the red light of a universal moratorium.

An analysis of such hustle and bustle in conjunction with other facts and events reveals certain patterns.

After the Russian and U.S. leaders' initiatives on drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals, nuclear experts in both countries had to all intents and purposes lost their former argument in favor of testing. Even before this, it was patently transparent. Behind the palisade of mythical arguments about technical security, verification [verifikatsiya], national security, and similar arguments the sole logically indisputable argument was laid bare—the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of nuclear warhead. And when this rotten fence of arguments which was constructed in the "cold war" period came under fire and tumbled, the real intentions of the advocates of nuclear deterrence were exposed. Naturally, it placed them in an unfavorable light. Frozen briefly under the public gaze, the "naked nuclear kings" began to construct new arguments.

By way of a sample let's look at a couple of the "newest" arguments. First, tests are necessary in order to develop [otrabotat] a type of warhead which terrorists will not be able to use if they get hold of it. Second, tests allow us to equip warheads with charges which will not explode even in the event of the most unlikely incident, and to fit them with triggers (actuating devices) which would not initiate an explosion even if the warhead is struck by lightning

Do you feel a little worried, citizens of the earth?

Such arguments proved unconvincing. Then the Russian and U.S. nuclear military-industrial complexes decided to exert heavy pressure on their peoples and parliaments and the leadership of these countries. How is this done? By pooling efforts. Aside from backstage political moves in Russia (B. Yeltsin's signing of the 27 February decree on beginning preparation of the Novaya Zemlya test site for tests in circumvention of the Russian parliament), U.S. nuclear physicists began to accompany their requests and demands with "explosive" arguments by inviting Russian colleagues to participate as observers.

Why the need for a coercive policy in respect of one's own peoples and legislators? At the end of last year two bills (HR 3636 and S 2064) were submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate for examination. Both sought to introduce a 12-month moratorium on nuclear testing in the United States. And by the end of March it had become clear that they were picking up more and more supporters.

Hearings and sessions on questions concerning the activity of the U.S. nuclear military-industrial complex were scheduled in committees of the U.S. Congress. In particular, plans for future nuclear tests were scheduled to be heard 25 March. However, this session was postponed until 31 March. Why? Because there had not been time to prepare the main coercive argument—the first nuclear explosion of 1992. It was carried out 26 March in the region of Paiute Mesa, 160 km from Las Vegas. The test's yield was between 20 and 150 kilotons. After the explosion subterranean tremors measuring 5.5 on the Richter scale were felt.

This "argument" was also needed for the debates in the Armed Services Committee on plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear military-industrial complex (1 April), on the future of the nuclear arsenal (8 April), and also on U.S. strategic nuclear weapons in the post-Soviet era (8 April). Furthermore, shortly before the first explosion the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment issued a report entitled "After the Cold War: Living With Lower Military Expenditure."

The second test was conducted 30 April under the poetic name of "Diamond of Destiny." Its aim consisted in monitoring [proverka] the parameters of the functioning of the military equipment as well as communications equipment during a nuclear explosion. The yield of the test in a horizontal tunnel did not exceed 20 kilotons.

This "argument" by the American nuclear hawks was also timed to coincide with specific events. Hearings took place in the commission on the activity of U.S. nuclear military-industrial complex enterprises 28 April at which the energy secretary delivered a report on plans and financial requirements for the development of nuclear arms; and he also prepared his 6 May speech on the 1993 budget before the Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence Subcommittee.

The "explosive" argument scheduled for 11 June also has a clear purpose. The examination of the law on 1993 defense budget expenditure is under way in Congress.

Contrary to the nuclear hawks' expectations, the number of supporters of a moratorium has continued to grow. By the beginning of June they constituted an overall majority in the House of Representatives—218—and in the Senate they numbered 42. To adopt a decision, 218 and 50 votes respectively are required.

Representatives of "Military Production Network," an alliance of U.S. scientific and civilian organizations which embraces over 20 groups actively opposed to the activities of certain enterprises in the U.S. nuclear military-industrial complex, have sent a letter to members of the Kazakh, Russian, and French parliaments asking parliamentarians to appeal personally to their colleagues in the U.S. Senate to support a moratorium. A letter of reply was signed by over 50 members of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. This appeal to the senators states in part:

"We hereby inform you that the Congress of Russian People's Deputies has approved a moratorium on nuclear tests and it has urged the parliaments of the nuclear states not to waste the historical opportunity which has arisen in the world following France's suspension of its nuclear testing program. As members of the Russian parliament, we appeal to you to support a moratorium. For our country, which is experiencing the most difficult socioeconomic crisis, support from the United States on the said question could, in conjunction with other measures, serve to help preserve democracy in our country."

"It seems to us that a 12-month pause in nuclear testing would also be useful for resolving domestic problems in the United States and for consciously reviewing the system of international treaties and organizations in a calm atmosphere."

A new announcement which has just arrived from the United States once again proves that turmoil has seized the nuclear physicists' camp. The 11 June test was put back a week. Without conjecturing over the reasons for such decisions, let us remember that it was on the 11th that Bush was expected to address the UN Conference in Brazil, and between 16 and 18 June B. Yeltsin is due to visit Washington and important documents are to be adopted.

If Congress adopts the U.S. bills, then the final decision will lie with the U.S. President, who could use his right of veto. During his visit the Russian leader has a chance to persuade Bush at the very least to effect a 12-month pause in testing. This pause is crucial to the world.

If this pause is not obtained, the world may have to face up to the fact that once the Nonproliferation Treaty expires in 1995 around 20 countries will receive the moral right to acquire nuclear-power status. If this happens, no superpower and no international organization will be able to control the course of events.

Devices Buried at Semipalatinsk Pose Dilemma

PM1706145992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jun 92 p 3

[Report by V. Gorchakov, A. Khokhlov, and O. Shevtsov: "Delayed"-Action Explosion"]

[Text] Rome—Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleymenov's sensational statement confirmed Western mass media reports that it is true that "three nuclear charges have disappeared" in the CIS. Speaking in Rome at a news conference organized by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the Italian Helsinki Committee and devoted to disarmament and human rights problems, he said that he even knows where they are located.

The three devices, brought in from the Russian "Chelyabinsk-70" nuclear center, had been located on the territory of the Semipalatinsk test site at a depth of 600 meters. They were to be detonated. But then our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was declared, and subsequently the USSR disintegrated and Kazakhstan announced the closure of the test site.

These charges could not have disappeared when strategic nuclear weapons were moved from Kazakhstan's territory to Russia: Each of them is buried under a 600-meter "pillar" of hard concrete. No one knows what to do about this. According to specialists, it is virtually impossible to remove the charges. Left buried underground, they may "go off" of their own accord in a number of years. This leaves...blowing them up. But what about the

moratorium? And how is the need for new "earthquakes" to be explained to the inhabitants of Kazakhstan?"

Three of the five nuclear test sites in the world already have fallen silent—Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk, Russia's Novaya Zemlya, and France's Mururoa. It is possible that the U.S. Nevada test site also will declare a moratorium in the near future. A chance to achieve a nuclear silence has emerged for the first time in history. However, the precedent of an explosion, albeit a necessary one, on Kazakh soil could reduce this chance to nought and trigger new tests at all five test sites.

Preparations at Novaya Zemlya Site 'Going Ahead'

PM1906081592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETTA in Russian 18 Jun 92 First Edition p 2

[Parliamentary observer Aleksandr Linkov report under the "Parliamentary Hearings" rubric: "Will Explosions Rock the Island?"]

[Text] Will there or will there not be nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya? Russian people's deputies decided to examine this in detail at their Sixth Congress. Especially as people living in the north and various social organizations keep sounding the alarm. A torrent of letters and telegrams demanding a complete ban on tests on the island is pouring into the Supreme Soviet. So on 16 June the Committee for Issues Relating to the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources and the Committee for Defense and Security held parliamentary hearings into whether it is advisable for the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site to continue functioning.

A total of 132 tests have been conducted there since the test site has been in existence, 90 of them in the atmosphere, above ground, or underwater. Following the Moscow agreement, the last 42 explosions have been underground. The designers claim that it is impossible to do without such tests in the natural environment when developing nuclear weapons. Theoretical research can only be confirmed by practical experiment. In laboratory conditions it is impossible to get a real picture of the processes that are occurring. Tests are also necessary to check and improve existing weapons. Today development trends in this weapons sector themselves depend primarily on a political decision, the formulation of Russia's military doctrine, and the drawing up of a blueprint for developing nuclear weapons. But at the moment the country's leadership has none of these

It is well known that the tests on Novaya Zemlya have been suspended for the time being. But work on preparing previously planned underground tunnels is going ahead. Admittedly, no nuclear charges nor the various monitoring devices have been supplied. Because if this work is stopped, it will take five to six years to start it up again. Incidentally, the cost of one of these tunnels comes to 15-20 million rubles [R], and a borehole costs R8-10 million.

According to an assessment by specialists, the radiation situation on the island is relatively favorable. Nor has it been disrupted during the tests that have been conducted, owing to the carefully manufactured designs.

Russia did not develop any nuclear weapons and had no sites of its own for testing them. All this was done by the leadership of the former Union in the strictest secrecy. It is only now that we are finding out about a lot of things. The Chernobyl disaster was a serious reminder to everyone of what a dangerous line mankind is treading. It is easy to understand the concerns of the northerners, who are living cheek by jowl not just with a powder keg but with an island stuffed with God knows what. After all, according to existing information, in the past a large amount of radioactive waste was buried deep in the sea near here, and it is not known how it will behave in the future. The Russian Supreme Soviet has still to decide the fate of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.

CIS Nuclear Tests Not Ruled Out in 1993

AU2206105892 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 21 Jun 92 pp 4-5

[Interview with Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, by F. Weckbach-Mara; place and date not given: "Russians Threaten To Resume Nuclear Testing"]

[Text] [Weckbach-Mara] How much longer does the CIS decision to halt nuclear tests still hold?

[Shaposhnikov] Until the end of the year. If by then the other nuclear powers fail to announce a halt to nuclear testing, Russia will be forced to resume its test series next year. However, if the others make such an announcement, we are ready to continue to abstain from testing.

[Weckbach-Mara] How many states on the territory of the former USSR have nuclear arms now?

[Shaposhnikov] The nuclear weapons of the former USSR are now stationed on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. They are under the supreme command of the CIS. The president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, has his finger on the button for using these weapons in an emergency. Nevertheless, it is our objective to eliminate all nuclear arms from the surface of the earth. A first step in that direction is a general ban on nuclear testing. The next step is the planned destruction of all nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction under mutual control.

[Weckbach-Mara] Will the CIS Armed Forces or armies of individual member states participate in military peace-keeping operations, for example in Azerbaijan or Yugoslavia?

[Shaposhnikov] Our regular Armed Forces have other tasks. However, for such cases we will set up groups of military observers and "collective forces for keeping the peace."

Military Seen Dodging Scrutiny of Novaya Zemlya Radiation Hazards

92WN0622A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov, chairman of the board of the "To Novaya ZEMLYA!" Ecological Safety Movement: "It Looks North, Like a Compass Needle"]

[Text] Anyone who saw, felt, and understood what happened in the atmosphere over the archipelago and deep within the earth, under its eternal frost, who guessed what forces raged there, after all that was experienced, was frightened out of his wits.

From time immemorial, courageous sailors and travelers have turned their eyes toward Novaya Zemlya. At the turn of the 20th century, the archipelago became a platform in the mastery of the Arctic, or rather, in its conquering, in man's vainglorious attempts to establish his rule over the world of white silence. These attempts ended tragically more often than not, but homo sapiens, especially homo sovieticus, could no longer be stopped by anything.

'Project 700'

The fate of many Russian islands befell Novaya Zemlya: Youthful lieutenants discovered them, and a century later generals from big politics closed them. As of 1954, the rapid construction of "Project 700," as the Northern range for testing nuclear arms was called in secret documents and documents with the "Special File" seal, began on the Arctic archipelago.

All economic activity—reindeer herding, fur trapping, and fishing—on the islands was stopped, the local soviet was abolished, and more than a hundred Novaya Zemlya families were resettled on the mainland, where for an agonizingly long time they had to adapt to a way of life, unfamiliar to the islanders.

The military began to make Novaya Zemlya habitable. Strictly speaking, the test range encompassed 90,000 square kilometers, 55,000 of which were on dry land. For comparison, the area of the entire archipelago is 82,000 square kilometers. According to the testimony of retired Lt. General G. Kudryavtsev, who in his day commanded the Northern Test Range, the first underwater nuclear explosion in the Soviet Union was conducted in Chernaya Bay at a depth of 50 meters on 25 September 1955. Two years later, on the east bank of this bay (the so-called zone "A"), the surface test of a nuclear warhead was conducted. In the same year, Chernaya Bay and the entire southwestern shore of the archipelago shuddered with the explosion of a nuclear torpedo from the submarine of Captain 1st Class G. Lazarev.

Today, at the test range Chernaya Bay is called a "sanitary zone." According to existing official reports, the radiation background there is up to 1000 microRoentgen/hour [mR/hr]. The few eyewitnesses say that for a long time the superstructures of half-sunken target ships, thrown into the shallows by the nuclear explosions, stuck up along the shore.

There is also an extensive sanitary zone at the cape of Sukhoy Nos, at the southwestern tip of the north island. There is reason to believe that serious contamination also exists in the Mityushin Bay-Krestova Bay region where tests of powerful thermonuclear warheads were conducted in the atmosphere over a specially prepared battlefield, including the explosion of a 58 megaton hydrogen bomb on 30 October 1961—a sad record and, alas, not the only Novaya Zemlya record of this type.

The most intensive periods of tests at Novaya Zemlya were in 1958 (26 atmospheric and underwater explosions), 1961 and 1962 (24 and 36 tests, respectively, all atmospheric). Their total TNT equivalent exceeds 90 megatons. No other nuclear test range on Earth has known such a colossal burden. For comparison, the total power of the 259 explosions, conducted in the atmosphere from 1949 to 1974 by the United States, Great Britain, and France taken together was 92 megatons. From 1964 to 1980, China conducted 22 atmospheric tests with an overall power of 12.7 megatons TNT equivalent.

According to data of USSR Goskomgidromet observation stations, after the 1961-1962 tests at the Novaya Zemlya test range, the levels of radioactive fallout in northern regions of the USSR increased by an order of 2-3 compared to 1960. For example, if we take the maximum density of radioactive fallout (by total beta activity) registered by the Goskomgidromet services at Amderma in 1962, it turns out that it exceeded present-day background values by a factor of 11,000 (!).

As is now becoming clear, nature in the Arctic belt turned out to be very sensitive to this fallout. By the late 1950s, the levels of radioactivity in the "lichen—reindeer—man" food chain in the region north of the 60th parallel already exceeded the background indicators by a factor of more than 10.

Meanwhile, to this day departmental commentaries on these comparisons are being made in soothing tones, even though it is admitted that the 1961-1962 series of powerful nuclear explosions caused the entry of the basic part of the radioactive products into the stratosphere and thence, after redistribution, to land. Surface contamination with cesium-137 and strontium-90, official science asserts, is related to global fallout from the atmospheric explosions of all countries whose test ranges are in the Northern hemisphere.

The same departmental reports characterize the radiation situation directly at Novaya Zemlya as entirely favorable: The average level of surface contamination of the island territory with cesium-137 is 0.09 curie per

square kilometer, and the average power level of a dose of gamma radiation is 10 ± 2 mR/hr (at a height of 1 meter); in regions where rocks with an elevated content of radioactive elements come up to the surface, the average dose is 16-25 mR/hr; there are local zones in Novaya Zemlya with high levels of contamination, which are strictly localized and far from places of human habitation, where the dose of gamma radiation at the present time does not exceed 1 mR/hr.

The command of the test range officially acknowledges the existence in its territory of only three sanitary zones, formed as a result of conducting the first underwater, ground, and powerful atmospheric nuclear explosions, as well as due to one accidental emission during an underground nuclear test. The obvious incompleteness of these data is indicated by many trustworthy sources. For example, there is the report of the St. Petersburg Scientific Research Institute for Radiation Hygiene, submitted for examination to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. In particular, it states: "Several dozen (!-A.Ye.) local sectors with an elevated radiation background (up to 2 mR/hr) of a diameter of from several hundred meters to 5 kilometers were discovered during aerial gamma photography of the Southern island by USSR Mingeo [Ministry of Geology] specialists..."

The USSR Mingeo specialists had succeeded in documenting that which ecologists had guessed for a long time. However, previously they had no opportunities to verify their assumptions and guesses under field conditions: From the moment the nuclear test range at Novaya Zemlya was created, the territory of the archipelago was virtually inaccessible for monitoring by the state nature-preservation services. Even now, regardless of the 2 November 1991 order by the President of the Russian Federation, "On Urgent Measures to Ensure Radiation Safety in the Territory of the RSFSR," the Main Headquarters of the Navy, under whose auspices the test range continues to remain, is obstructing the organization of comprehensive radiological and ecological studies of Novaya Zemlya and adjoining bodies of water in the Kara and Barents seas. Meanwhile, the conduct of this work must not be delayed any longer.

Traces in the Water!

The information, popularized in the open press, about the secret sinking of radioactive wastes in open regions of the Barents Sea and in shallow bays on the Kara side of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago elicits particular alarm from specialists and society (including in the Scandinavian countries). These operations were carried out from 1961 to 1990 by technical vessels of the Murmansk Steamship Line and the Navy with obvious violations of the requirements of MAGATE and the London Convention on preventing the contamination of seas and oceans.

According to existing information, more than 11,000 containers with radioactive wastes, as well as 15 damaged reactors from nuclear submarines and the "Lenin"

icebreaker—5 of the reactors with the nuclear fuel still loaded—were sunk near Novaya Zemlya.

In rapidly developing atomic power and feverishly cultivating nuclear arsenals, we gave little thought to the consequences and were not concerned about tomorrow. The means were found only to design and build a new nuclear ship, a new reactor... The accident rate grew, and with it, like a snowball, the problems of utilization and storage of radioactive wastes also grew. They saw a way out in hiding the traces in the water.

Here are just a few fragments of this gloomy chronicle, which has been restored from archive documents.

From 1967 to 1990 the auxiliary ships of the "Atomflot" sank 1,450 containers with solid radioactive wastes in the area of the Novaya Zemlya deep-water valleys. The total radioactivity, according to data of the Navy Main Administration for Use and Repair, was about 3,000 curies. Besides this, the reports do not indicate: In 1972, the barge MBSN-356250 was sunk with a nuclear reactor, removed from a damaged submarine (total radioactivity—170,000 curies); in August 1976, the PSSN-328 lighter for the transport of liquid radioactive wastes was sunk. In addition, 4,750 containers and the lighter "N. Bauman" (in September 1964), and the central compartment of the icebreaker "Lenin" with three damaged reactors and a crane assembly (October 1967) were sunk in Tsivolok Bay.

Abrosimov Bay was turned into a radioactive cemetery even earlier. In 1965-1966, the compartments of four damaged nuclear submarines were sunk here. Next door, in Stepoviy Bay, 1,850 containers and the damaged nuclear submarine K-27 were sunk at a depth of 35-50 meters.

This dark list could go on even longer. It is also known that liquid radioactive wastes were poured by Navy and "Atomflot" vessels into five regions of the Barents Sea from 1961 to 1990.

The paradoxical nature of the situation lies in the fact that the command of the test range and the 8th Main Administration of the Navy, which oversees its work, categorically refuse to comment on these facts and to bear responsibility for what happened for many years within the borders of the test range and near it. They explain this by the fact that operations with radioactive wastes were performed by a different subdivision of the Navy, the Main Administration for Use and Repair.

Meanwhile, in the territory of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk oblasts the number of nuclear power installations has exceeded 270 units. In this regard, the problem of dealing with radioactive wastes, formed in the process of use and repair and as a consequence of removing the first-and second-generation nuclear submarines from fighting status, acquires extraordinary urgency. Today already, about 20 submarines with nuclear reactors that are worn out or no longer fit for use have accumulated in the Northern Fleet.

Specialists believe that the creation of a regional radioactive waste burial site here, meeting the requirements of MAGATE, would help cardinally to solve the problem of radioactive wastes in Russia's European North. The Murmansk Oblast administration, the command of the Northern Fleet, and the Scientific Research Institute for Industrial Technology (Moscow) have submitted a proposal to locate such a burial site on the southern island of Novaya Zemlya, in the borders of the Central Test Range of the Russian Federation. However, there is also an alternate proposal: A plan to locate the regional radioactive waste burial site on the Kola Peninsula, in the rock strata of the Dalniye Zelentsy region, has been drafted by the St. Petersburg Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering Technology.

In order to objectively assess the merits and shortcomings of both plans, it is proposed to organize the state expert analysis of them, including the economic, ecological, social, and technological aspects, as soon as possible.

The question of transferring the Central Test Range to the auspices of the Russian Federation Ministry of Nuclear Power is becoming ever more topical. Then the Ministry of Defense would retain only the functions of guarding its borders and ensuring a regime of safety. This would help remove many extreme limitations.

To Novaya Zemlya!

A conference on the unification of anti-nuclear, ecological, and eco-cultural organizations of the northwestern oblasts of Russia into a popular movement for ecological safety, "To Novaya ZEMLYA!" was held in the fall of 1991 in Arkhangelsk. Its programmatic goal is to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya and throughout the world. Among its practical tasks are: the restoration of the true picture of everything that happened at Novaya Zemlya from the moment the nuclear test range was created there; the organization of a comprehensive radiological and ecological study of the archipelago and the sites where radioactive wastes were sunk; the revelation of the distant consequences of nuclear arms tests on the population's health for the purpose of medical and social rehabilitation; and conversion of the archipelago, the involvement of its natural and raw material resources in economic circulation.

We consider the thoughtfulness of evaluations and authenticity of the information being disseminated an indispensable condition of our work. In many cases, our volunteer consultants and experts have at their disposal more complete and more accurate information on the ecological problems of the region, than the state ecological monitoring services. This also relates to data on the sinking of solid and pouring of liquid radioactive wastes in the area of Novaya Zemlya, as well as in open regions of the Barents and Kara seas. At the present time, we are conducting an additional search for eyewitnesses and participants in such operations, and we are systematically organizing their recollections.

We are also open to cooperation in other areas of our activity. The dynamic appeal—To Novaya ZEMLYA [a New LAND!—should not be interpreted only in the literal, geographic sense. We are not urging our supporters to storm the archipelago and its secret projects. To a New LAND means to a renewed, safe planet to live on, to a new world order based on good-neighbor and cooperation principles, ruling out violence and military threat as a political argument.

Norwegian Minister Calls For Testing Moratorium

LD2306145892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1410 GMT 23 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Text] Oslo June 23 TASS—Norway's Minister of International Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg called for a moratorium among the four nations that continue to test nuclear weapons.

In a letter addressed to his counterparts in Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United States, Stoltenberg stressed the current world situation offered unprecedented opportunity to conclude an international agreement to stop nuclear weapons' testing.

Norway's initiative, Stoltenberg noted today in a radio interview, follows France's decision to halt nuclear testing this year, and the urging of U.S. congressional representatives to enact a testing moratorium in the United States. The Russian Government announced its intentions to continue testing as long as the U.S., Great Britain, and China do so.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Visit to Microbiology Institute Described
PM1506095392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "We Have No Bacteriological Weapons," Military Bacteriologists Maintain"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Defense Microbiology Research Institute is in very center of the city of Kirov. And although there is still no sign outside it, the fence surrounding it is covered with barbed wire, entry into and exit from the installation is by permit only, and this was the first time that journalists from Moscow had been allowed in here, everyone in the area knows that the institute is directly connected with bacteriological weapons.

"We have not produced any bacteriological weapons in the past and we are not doing so now," Colonel Yevgeniy Pimenov, head of the institute, stated categorically. "Our main purpose is to provide means of protection against dangerous bacteriological pathogens. And this means protection both for the military and for civilians."

Colonel Pimenov is young—he is only 40. But he is already a doctor of medical sciences, an honored Armed Forces specialist, and winner of the State Prize, and he occupies a general's post. He started off here in Kirov as a lieutenant after graduating from the Second Medical Institute, where he specialized in biophysics. The institute has 36 State Prize winners, five doctors of science, 82 candidates, and a total of 114 officers who are scientists.

What do they do? Their range of interests includes microbiology, epidemiology, immunology, genetics, aerobiology, biochemistry, biophysics, physical and colloidal chemistry, and biotechnology...It was here in Kirov that, back in the Great Patriotic War, military bacteriologists created the first industrial batch of penicillin, which saved the lives of thousands of servicemen, the first streptomycin and other antibiotics against the plague, tularemia, glanders, and anthrax....

The combined vaccine against anthrax developed in the institute is without equal in the world as regards effectiveness, the scientists claim. We were told how, during the preparations for the general attack on Iraqi positions, the American command recalled that Saddam Husayn possesses bacteriological weapons, including anthrax, and the coalition forces had only 40,000 doses of antidote for 400,000 officers and men (and even that was intended for animals).

The Americans appealed to us to sell them the vaccine, and offered us a very advantageous contract, but by the time the Central Committee and the military-industrial complex leadership had decided whether or not they should sell the antidote, time had passed and the war had ended.

The institute does not hide the fact that it works with particularly dangerous bacteria. After all, you can verify the action of a protective vaccine only by means of experiments. We were allowed to enter the building where they are carried out. But we were warned that first of all we would have to be inoculated, and following our visit to the building we would have to go into quarantine for two weeks, as the institute's employees do. Alas, we did not have the time.

But, as the scientists maintain, the following fact testifies to the level of epidemiological protection and security in the institute: A total of 1,600 people live on the territory of the scientific research institute, including women and children—the families of the most senior specialists. We saw children playing freely by the fences surrounded by barbed wire and by the bunkers.

The microbiological institute has many problems today. The main one is the lack of resources. One-third of employees have already left as a result of this. There is only enough money in the budget for earnings, there is no question of paying for the experiments, or food for the guinea pigs, mice, and monkeys. The solution lies in conversion. And there is a program aimed at this—with offers worth 8 million rubles. But the servicemen's hands

are tied by the ban on their commercial activity. Admittedly, that is suitable material for another article.

Yeltsin, Bush Stress Elimination of Chemical Weapons

*LD1806133492 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0906 GMT 18 Jun 92*

[Text] [No dateline as received]—President Yeltsin and President Bush have stressed their adherence to the elimination of chemical weapons at the global level. They expressed confidence that the Geneva talks on a multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons may be concluded by the end of August. They agreed to give relevant instructions to their representatives and appealed to all the participants in the talks to do everything possible to attain this goal. They expressed hope that within this time a conference at the ministerial level may be convened to endorse the convention.

Both presidents stressed their support for the memorandum on understanding with regard to step-by-step confidence building measures concluded in Wyoming in 1989, and agreed to implement the memorandum's provisions on the exchange of detailed information and inspections as soon as preparations are completed. They also agreed that the bilateral agreement on chemical weapons of June 1990 should be updated and should come into force promptly.

Order on Chemical Weapon Destruction Reviewed

*PM2206114492 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jun 92 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report under the rubric "The Government Has Resolved": "For the Destroyers of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] By a presidential directive, priority measures have been laid down for the fulfillment of Russia's international commitments in the sphere of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

The presidential Committee for Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons is charged with the organizational responsibility. The committee is instructed within two months to draw up and, by agreement with local organs of power, submit to the government proposals for the phased creation of a system of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. Here provision must be made for measures to ensure the social protection of personnel, the comprehensive development of the social infrastructure, and the improvement of material and social provisions for the population.

This includes establishing privileges and advantages as regards working conditions, remuneration, and pension provision for workers engaged in the destruction of weapons. Individual houses and health camps for children are to be built in a 15-km zone around the facilities.

Diagnostic centers are to be set up at medical institutions serving workers at the facilities. Ecological monitoring systems and information points are to be set up in all inhabited localities in the zones. Compulsory state personal insurance and insurance of citizens' property is to be organized.

Chemical Weapons Convention Prohibits Production, Storage

92UM1192A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
24 June 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* Correspondent Aleksey Portanskiy: "A Convention on the Complete Banning of Chemical Weapons Is Ready"]

[Text] In Geneva, the Disarmament Conference has completed work on a draft Convention on the Complete Banning and Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Its elaboration was preceded by 24 years of negotiations. It is particularly important that the new document, in contrast to the 1925 Protocol, prohibits not only the use but also the production and storage of toxins.

According to the preliminary estimates, the Convention will be signed by all the European states, the United States, Canada and Japan. Their example will be followed by Latin America as well as many African and Asian states. The signing of the Convention should occur no later than the beginning of next year. The experts have voiced certain doubts over the Arab states and Israel which could defer signing until that time when concrete results have been achieved in the on-going talks being held between them. As a whole, the number of those which will sign the Convention, it is expected, should be fully sufficient for it to come into effective force.

A most important element in the Convention and one which is aimed at ensuring its unwavering fulfillment will be a system of international verification. It will be rather hard to carry this out, since the convention extends not only to military installations but also to industrial enterprises which are potentially capable of producing chemical weapons. The text of the document makes provision for inspections at any time and at any place. The state which is a participant to the Convention has merely to be warned five days prior to the arrival of the international inspectors.

For implementing the provisions of the Convention, it is planned that a special international organization will be set up similar in type to the IAEA with a headquarters in the Hague or Vienna. Here they will take into account all the negative experience of the IAEA which was unable to prevent the setting up of a large-scale program in Iraq to develop nuclear weapons.

As for the frequency of inspections, as the specialist assume, such a state as the U.S. could expect 10-12 planned inspections a year and several surprise ones.

The existence of the Convention should serve as a restraining factor also for those states which do not want to sign it. They will certainly come under international pressure and various sanctions, if they want to begin their own production of chemical weapons.

As is known, the Soviet Union was from the very outset an active participant in the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons. At present the legal successor to the former Union, Russia, will encounter significant difficulties in resolving the problem of eliminating these weapons. According to the Soviet-American agreement signed in June 1990, the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles on the territory of the former USSR (with the exception of Russia, the other republics do not have their own stocks of the given weapons) should begin prior to 31 December 1992. However, up to now the corresponding program has not been approved and most importantly there are no funds to implement such a program.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Uzbekistan Supports Nuclear-Free Pacific

LD2306085192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0815 GMT 23 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Fedortsov]

[Text] Jakarta, June 23 TASS—There are all indications to think that Uzbekistan and Indonesia will exchange ambassadors in the near future. President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, who is in Indonesia on a state visit, said during the dinner hosted in his honour by Indonesian President Suharto. We consider Indonesia one of our closest and friendly states and this understanding is founded not only on the commonness of our culture, religion and traditions, the president emphasised. We support Indonesia in its policy of positive neutrality, in its efforts to ensure peace in South-East Asia and a ban on nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean region. Like Indonesia, we oppose racism, apartheid, and stand for equality and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries of the world.

Pointing out to good prospects of economic relations between the two states, President Karimov said: "Uzbekistan only recently became the master of its own natural resources. However, the possibilities which we possess are so promising that it can reach the level of most developed countries in a few years, provided, of course, we manage our national economy in a right manner. There is no doubt that we can rely on such friendly countries as Indonesia in achieving our aim.

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

U.S. Military Delegation Visits Baltic Fleet

LD2206101792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 19 Jun 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Eliminating nuclear weapons will take more than just a year but a start has already been made. A report from Kaliningrad:

[Correspondent S. Chekalin] A U.S. military delegation headed by Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Frank Kelso, has arrived on a visit to Kaliningrad and the Baltiysk Naval Base. The delegation was received by Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet. Their talks concerned collective security in Europe, particularly in the northeastern part of the Baltic where, in the view of the American admiral, a new geopolitical reality has come into being. If stability in this area was previously determined by parity between the naval forces of the former USSR and the Atlantic union, since the departure of Russian navy units and ships from the Baltic states this parity could be disturbed and, in the view of the American admiral, this cannot be permitted. In reply to my question on the prospects for cuts in U.S. sea-based nuclear weapons, Admiral Kelso said that as a result of President Yeltsin's historic visit to the United States, there has been a sensational reduction in nuclear arsenals, and it is now possible to start thinking serious about sea-based missiles. That's the next phase, said Admiral Frank Kelso. [video shows U.S. and Russian flags on tables as admirals meet to talk; Kelso shown with correspondent]

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Byelarus Needs 7 Years To Eliminate Weapons

LD1506172192 Moscow Radio Rossiia Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Jun 92

[Text] The Republic of Byelarus will need seven years to rid itself totally of strategic nuclear weapons, it was stated in a conversation with a BELTA correspondent by Leonid Privalov, a Byelarus people's deputy and deputy chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet Commission for Issues of National Security, Defense, and Fighting Crime. He said that in order to complete the operation more quickly, huge funds are needed which, considering the economic mess and the difficulties in developing a budget and creating our own armed forces, we cannot afford. However, the people's deputy stressed, Byelarus has no intention of preserving strategic offensive nuclear weapons.

Report On Kravchuk's Visit To Paris

Reiterates Nuclear-Free Pledge

LD1606155292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1529 GMT 16 Jun 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Viktor Demidenko—TASS]

[Text] Paris June 16 TASS—Ukraine reiterated its pledge to become nuclear-free in a treaty on mutual understanding and cooperation signed with France by presidents of the two countries on Tuesday [16 June].

The treaty also envisages further development of bilateral ties, as well as interaction between the two states in international organisations. The two countries will hold immediate consultations in case a threat to peace emerges. The main direction of cooperation between Ukraine and France is "to build a peaceful Europe based on principles of solidarity".

President of France Francois Mitterrand welcomed the signing of the treaty saying his country is happy to have an opportunity of discussing major international affairs with a new partner.

The treaty is the first such document in our history. President Kravchuk of Ukraine said. It is very important that the document covers all spheres of cooperation—from politics and economics to culture and environmental protection. "I hope the document will contribute to building a peaceful and united Europe", the president said.

Also on Tuesday Kravchuk signed the Paris Charter making Ukraine the 52nd party to the basic treaty on security and cooperation in Europe.

This event signifies an end to the policy of blocs, Mitterrand underlined, adding Europe is accepting Ukraine as a one hundred per cent European state.

By signing the Paris Charter Ukraine reiterated its commitment to observe the principles of the Helsinki process, Kravchuk told TASS after the signing ceremony.

Ukraine will do everything possible to ensure, together with other states, a lasting peace and security on the continent and promote its further democratisation and human rights protection, the president added.

Goals of Visit Viewed

PM1806111192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Yuriy Kovalenko report: "L. Kravchuk in Paris Preparing the Ground for Ukrainian Entry into the EC"]

[Text] Paris—At the same time as Boris Yeltsin is holding talks with George Bush in Washington, Leonid Kravchuk is starting his discussions with Francois Mitterrand in Paris.

These discussions are mainly devoted to European problems and bilateral relations. First and foremost in the Elysee Palace, the Ukrainian president will sign the CSCE's Paris Charter and confirm his country's intention to take an active part in all-European cooperation. Kiev is hoping for support from Paris on this score.

It may be assumed that the Ukrainian president will explore the possibility of Ukraine's joining the EC. At least Lionel Stoleru, a former French minister and current economic adviser to L. Kravchuk, stated recently that Ukraine is the only republic of the former Soviet Union that could in the future become an EC member.

Paris is not least interested in the future of the nuclear arsenals located on Ukrainian territory. There is lively discussion here of L. Kravchuk's recent statement that B. Yeltsin does not have a mandate to discuss the disarmament problems of other states of the former USSR at his meetings in Washington, and that Ukraine intends to ratify the START Treaty as soon as possible.

Paris is watching the zigzags in Russian-Ukrainian relations with concern, above all their effect on nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, and Crimea. On the eve of L. Kravchuk's visit the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the French Foreign Ministry, and to the foreign policy departments of all other states, saying that all the former USSR states are entitled to their share of all-Union property abroad. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry is therefore asking France—until this problem is resolved within the CIS framework—to ensure that this state property and the property of former all-Union nongovernment organizations and juridical persons on French territory are preserved intact and that all attempts to change its status are cut short.

During his visit the Ukrainian president will also sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with France and an agreement about offering assistance in setting up a higher administration school in Kiev. In addition, it is expected that a document on establishing a Ukrainian trade center in Paris will be signed; this will be a joint-stock company in which both French and Ukrainian capital will be invested.

Ukrainian representatives are putting special emphasis on the fact that the president has come to France not to ask for money but to propose cooperation and explain the advantages that French businessmen will gain from investing capital in the Ukrainian economy. For this reason, among others, the Ukrainian president is holding two meetings with business circles. Kiev is also hoping for assistance from Paris on conversion issues—to this end a delegation of French military personnel and industrialists headed by Secretary of State for Defense J. Mellick visited Ukraine at the beginning of March.

Approves US-Russian Nuclear Reductions

PM1906094992 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
19 Jun 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 5

[Yuriy Kovalenko report: "Leonid Kravchuk: 'We Want Relations Between Russia and Ukraine To Be Like Those Between the United States and Canada'"]

[Text] Paris—Ukraine approves of the U.S.-Russian Treaty on Reducing Strategic Nuclear Weapons, proceeding from the fact that Kiev has taken the decision to liquidate nuclear arsenals located on its territory and become a nonnuclear state. This was declared by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk at a news conference devoted to the results of his visit to France.

L. Kravchuk mentioned the agreement among the four nuclear states—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—according to which they are participants in the Treaty on Reducing Strategic Nuclear Weapons concluded between the USSR and the United States. Yeltsin was holding talks in Washington on Russia's behalf, the Ukrainian president stressed, and therefore he did not need to consult with me first.

Did L. Kravchuk not consider it premature for Ukraine to reduce its strategic weapons, given the constant threats stemming from Russia? No, he did not. That is our policy, he said, and we intend to conduct it consistently. We can count on our own forces and on our integration into the European community to guarantee our security.

"We will discuss relations with Russia in a broad political and economic context with Boris Yeltsin 23 June," the Ukrainian president stressed. What we want to have with Russia are equal, extensive links which befit our history. Basically, we want relations between Ukraine and Russia to be like those which exist between Canada and the United States. This is our ideal. However, not only Ukraine must want this, but Russia too.

L. Kravchuk went on to say: We will not discuss the Crimean problem with Boris Yeltsin. This is a problem of relations between Ukraine and Crimea. A delegation has been formed to draw up an agreement between the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments. It is conducting talks on political and economic relations between them.

L. Kravchuk also touched on the problem of Ukraine's withdrawing from the ruble zone. We will withdraw from it once we have reached agreement with Russia, he said. Relevant talks are currently under way. Documents have already been hammered out [narabotanny]. We do not want either Ukraine or Russia to suffer from this. Everything must be settled in a civilized way.

As for Russia's defense of its borders, that is its right, the Ukrainian president noted. Today, corrupt mafia structures are exporting great quantities of valuables and national wealth out of Russia via not just Ukraine but other states too. Order must be restored in this matter.

L. Kravchuk expressed his viewpoint on the future of the CIS. For us, the Commonwealth of Independent States is a structure which can still play an important role. But it is necessary for all of its members to be equal, with no one state trying to dictate to the others. To achieve this, mechanisms are required, some kind of arbitration system which is capable—even through coercive channels—of bringing about compliance with decisions adopted within the CIS framework.

L. Kravchuk claims that in the current state of affairs the CIS is only compromising itself. Ukraine is not trying to destroy the CIS; it merely wants its structures to work, otherwise it is pointless. The CIS must not be a screen for conducting one state's policy or one state's diktat.

Finally, referring to relations with France, L. Kravchuk said that that country would like to see Ukraine as a participant in all European structures. A Europe without a major European state—which is what Ukraine is—is untenable, he said. Paris understands this, and therefore France's participation in Ukraine's economic and political affairs will further the creation of a new Europe, a new civilized order.

Shaposhnikov on Ukraine Nuclear Power Ambitions

LD2006112292 Moscow Radio Rossiia Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 20 Jun 92

[Text] Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Commonwealth's armed forces, expressed regret at Ukraine's unwillingness to participate in the CIS collective security system at a meeting with journalists on Friday [19 June]. The commander in chief views this state's stand on strategic nuclear weapons as not constructive enough, ITAR-TASS reports. Signs are emerging that Ukraine is striving to become a nuclear power, he stated. In the marshal's view, Kiev ought to announce such a decision openly, so that the world community may react in an adequate way.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov's stand on the Black Sea Fleet is that the ships and shore facilities are a component of the Commonwealth's strategic forces, with the exception of the part to be transferred to Ukraine. It is for Ukraine and Russia to decide how to determine what proportion this is at the talks between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk, which begin in Dagomys next week, Marshal Shaposhnikov said.

Ukrainian Parliamentarian Criticizes Shaposhnikov

LD2306133492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 22 Jun 92

[Text] The utterances of Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, were described as groundless by the commission of the Ukrainian parliament on the issues of defense and state security. He stated at the news conference in Moscow

that the position of Ukraine on strategic nuclear weapons is insufficiently constructive and, in the opinion of the marshal, is a sign of our state's aspiration to become nuclear. Shaposhnikov also expressed disappointment on Ukraine's unwillingness to join the system of collective security of the Commonwealth.

In an interview to the teleradio agency "Novyny," Valentyn Lemesh, deputy head of the parliament commission on the questions of defense and state security, stressed that Ukraine is not changing its course on reaching a nuclear-free status. It became in its time an owner of nuclear weapons not by its own will but as part of the former Union. As for the collective security, as Valentyn Lemesh stated, joining such a system runs counter to the intention of Ukraine to become a neutral state outside any blocks. At the same time, Ukraine supports on a bilateral basis development of many-sided relations with the CIS countries including in the military sphere.

Report On Dagomys Nuclear Issues

Yeltsin Wants To Hear Ukraine Approach

OW2306112392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1030 GMT 23 Jun 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] At their meeting in Dagomys the presidents of Russia and Ukraine have decided to drop the disputed issue of the Crimea from the agenda. The understanding was reached during the private conversation of Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk which opened the summit talks in the Black sea town on Tuesday [23 June]. It was decided that questions related to the Black Sea Fleet should be discussed "calmly, without emotions".

Later the talks were joined by delegations.

The next round of private talks of the two presidents is due at 15:00 Moscow time.

In Dagomys Russia will work for a full-scale political agreement with Ukraine which is the main purpose of the meeting. A mechanism for continuing such negotiations should be set up. The Russian side also intends to raise the issue of expanding cooperation with Ukraine in the framework of the CIS and intensifying joint efforts to settle conflicts in the Commonwealth.

The second set of issues President Yeltsin is to discuss with his Ukrainian counterpart is related to defence. The Russian delegation wants to hear details of Kiev's approach to nuclear weapons and the status of strategic forces in Ukrainian territory, the time of signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as well as the principles of settling the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. [passage omitted]

Grachev on Control of Weapons

*LD2306105192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1000 GMT 23 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Dagomys (Southern Russia), 23 Jun—"The Ukrainian delegation is insisting on administrative control of strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory," said Army General Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, to the ITAR-TASS correspondent in the corridor at the Dagomys talks today.

"This would essentially lead to dual subordination of strategic units—to Ukraine and to the CIS Joint Armed Forces," he said. This means a situation in which issues such as paying for the upkeep of servicemen, taking

charge of routine drafts, and providing housing, would fall in the area of competence of the Ukrainian military command.

"Russia does not agree with this," the minister stressed. "Our view is unambiguous: the operational control of strategic forces must be exercised through the CIS Joint Armed Forces. We have agreed to prepare a working document in which we will attempt to agree on our positions at the level of experts." In the afternoon it will become known how productive this work has been.

"Although legally the strategic missile forces are, following the Lisbon meeting, Russian and Russia is fully responsible for their use," the minister said, "for the time being the missiles are on the territory of four states and they are to be managed by the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Strategic Forces Command of the Commonwealth."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

CFE Accord Expected Before Helsinki Meeting

AI 2006180092 Vienna *DER STANDARD* in German
20 Jun 92 p 2

[Norbert Mayer report: "Finale at the Vienna Disarmament Agreement"]

[Excerpt] Vienna—After the big successes in strategic disarmament at the Washington summit, an agreement at the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) according to plan now seems very likely. Western diplomatic circles said on 19 June that they expect CFE I to be adopted before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki on 9 July. [passage omitted]

Report On Black Sea Economic Cooperation Summit

Ukraine's Kravchuk Supports Nuclear-free Region

TA2406185192 Ankara *ANATOLIA* in Turkish
1725 GMT 24 Jun 92

[Excerpt] Istanbul, 24 June (AA)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and his wife, Antinna, arrived in Istanbul by air at 1710 today to attend the Black Sea economic cooperation summit.

Kravchuk and his wife were received at Ataturk Airport by [Turkish] State Minister Serif Ercan and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and his wife, Inci.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko also arrived in Istanbul with the president.

In a statement to journalists at the state residence for guests, Kravchuk referred to his meeting yesterday with Russian President Yeltsin and said that a very important document has been signed. Kravchuk explained that the document will provide for new opportunities between the two countries.

As for the Black Sea economic cooperation summit, Kravchuk said that the document to be signed is important for the countries of the region as well as for the world.

Kravchuk continued: We are convinced that the Black Sea will be a demilitarized and nuclear-free region. People in this region will live in peace. This initiative undertaken by Turkey will be appreciated by the whole world. [passage omitted]

Kravchuk Addresses Summit

TA2506170292 Ankara *TRT Television Network* in Turkish 0735 GMT 25 Jun 92

[Speech by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk at the opening session of the Black Sea economic cooperation summit in Istanbul—live, in Russian with superimposed Turkish translation]

[Excerpts] Honorable president, presidents, prime ministers, ladies and gentlemen: I am honored that I was given a chance to speak at the signing ceremony of the declaration.

I see concrete evidence that the countries represented here support Turkey's views. In signing the declaration today, these countries will have a unique opportunity to carry out economic and political cooperation in the history of the peoples of the Black Sea region. [passage omitted]

My country, which has shown the necessary initiative regarding the purge of nuclear weapons from the Black Sea region, is continuing to work in this direction.

I believe that with joined forces we can overcome various problems and turn the Black Sea region into one of peace, stability, and prosperity.

Ladies and gentlemen, the constructive views posited here are very important for the mutual cooperation among the Black Sea countries. We are being given a historical chance, while at the same time history is giving us a certain responsibility. Will today be the beginning of a new and peaceful world, or will it be a mere memory? The responsibility is ours. Ukraine is ready to do its share. It is ready to do everything it can to ensure that the region's peoples live in peace and tranquillity and enjoy their potential.

Thank you for your attention.

Shevardnadze On Naval Reductions

TA2506142592 Ankara *TRT Television Network* in Turkish 0735 GMT 25 Jun 92

[Speech by Georgian State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze at the opening session of the Black Sea economic cooperation summit in Istanbul—live, in Russian with superimposed simultaneous translation into Turkish]

[Text] Honorable president, ladies and gentlemen: In December 1990, when I was speaking to Turkish President Turgut Ozal, I was first informed about the project which later would be known worldwide as the Ozal plan. This plan is now turning into the BSEC declaration. Most of us consider the establishment of a healthy economy to be the fundamental democratic duty of states. The economic cooperation among the countries in the Black Sea region envisaged by this project constitutes a significant and unique opportunity for us.

Following the [word indistinct] interpretation of the situation, we feel obliged to state the following: Unless there are solid guarantees for the security of each country, especially the countries participating in the BSEC, this unity is condemned to wither before it flourishes.

We are living in difficult times. The Black Sea region is quite tense and is currently the stage for dangerous

conflicts. At the moment, it is essential to hold active political negotiations in addition to economic cooperation. Mutual interaction must take place on a regional level within various structures of cooperation. Allow me to express my views on this subject.

First, we propose to establish a regional organization that will provide high-level political, economic, ecological, cultural, and (?legal) integration. Time is needed for the 10 countries of the Black Sea region to reach a stage in which they can work in unity. We will march in this direction. The Georgian delegation has reached an agreement to protect the unity of the Black Sea region. We propose to establish a multinational secretariat with headquarters in Istanbul. This secretariat must be chaired by the heads of state of the signatory countries on a rotational basis. This organization must also meet annually in Istanbul at the highest level. Furthermore, various political and economic integration programs must be prepared both at a general assembly and at the secretariat.

Second, we are proposing to establish the following organs affiliated with the Black Sea union: foreign ministers committee; defense ministers committee; bureaus to liaise with the CSCE and other international organizations; agencies concerning environmental protection and the ecology of the Black Sea; committees for culture, sports, tourism, and leisure; bureaus on human rights, minority rights, and religion; an entrepreneurs union; a trade and transit transportation committee; and a committee for social issues and immigration.

Third, all heads of state are encountering various issues here. There are no single solutions to these problems. I believe that we can succeed only if we try to resolve these problems collectively. I further propose to establish a committee that will take steps concerning confrontations, a committee to be comprised of representatives from all the participating countries. Georgia is ready to fulfill its task concerning this committee.

We are also proposing a moratorium on changes to existing borders for the next five years, or even until the year 2000. Failing this, it will be impossible for us to conduct the necessary border negotiations at this stage. Moreover, important steps must be taken to protect cease-fires and the status quo in practice. Such a moratorium can be realized through an intensive dialogue and political negotiations.

[Word indistinct] is responsible for undertaking the necessary tasks concerning the reduction of military forces in Europe. In addition, all the necessary measures must be adopted in connection with the Helsinki process, and these measures must be introduced into our region.

Because we are carrying out cooperation in the Black Sea region, we must engage in activities to reduce the naval forces in the Black Sea region in accordance with the Paris Charter. I am talking about signing an agreement or a convention to adopt measures to reduce naval forces

in charge of sea, underwater, and shore defenses. My proposal also envisages the just resolution of the problem concerning the Black Sea Fleet belonging to the former Soviet Union. If needed, we are ready to adopt the necessary measures on this subject. It will also be very beneficial for all Black Sea countries to accept certain quotas with regard to this issue. The problems concerning the Black Sea Fleet can thus be solved.

Fourth, it will be beneficial to make certain reciprocal commitments. We are talking about newly established states, as well as countries with which the Soviet Union was formerly engaged in good-neighborly relations. Given these circumstances, it is possible to take significant steps toward the gradual solution of the legal, economic, financial, and other problems between the relevant countries.

Honorable ladies and gentlemen, as mentioned in Georgian mythology [words indistinct] sought salvation in these territories in the Black Sea. In these difficult times, we are also seeking the same salvation in the Black Sea region within an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. I hope that we will find this with your cooperation.

GERMANY

Commentary Views Future U.S.-Russian Relations AU1606131792 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 16 Jun 92 p 4

[Josef Joffe commentary: "New Pieces, Old Game"]

[Text] This summit can at least be proud of being something entirely new: For the first time ever the presidents of America and Russia will meet in Washington today. What is missing, however, is the dramatic political element, the fear and hope by which so many Soviet-U.S. summit meetings were dominated: from Vienna 1961, where Khrushchev wanted to teach young Kennedy "to learn fear," to Washington 1990, where Gorbachev declared capitulation in the cold war.

The duels and embraces, the threats and breakthroughs—all those substitute actions that so pleasantly highlighted the difference between the "cold" and a real war no longer exist because the Soviet Union ceased to exist. This is why we find it hard to anticipate the first Bush-Yeltsin summit with the same anxious suspense that prevailed at the 23 postwar summit meetings with Soviet leaders. In Washington a Russian president will make an appearance, a president who only represents a possible future superpower—a Russia that, because of its size and weapons arsenals could be a natural superpower, but currently acts only as a petitioner.

Russia's temporary relegation to the second division has not made things easier for Bush. U.S. policy is generally divided in its attitude toward the successors to the Soviet Union—a phenomenon that can be observed on the Russian side in a similar way. Two souls are struggling

with each other in Bush's breast. One of them whispers: Make hay while the sun shines; integrate Moscow into a lasting structure of cooperation so that the struggle for predominance will never again erupt. Yeltsin supporter Nixon put it quite succinctly: "Yeltsin is the most pro-Western-oriented leader in the history" of Russia, which is why the West must help him with all its strength. The theory behind this is simple, maybe all too simple: Economic growth equals peace equals billions in savings in the arms sector.

The other voice is warning Bush that money is no guarantee of recovery, and that gratitude—the weakest motive for any policy—is no guarantee of good behavior. On the contrary, he has to fear that a Russia that is gaining strength will return to a policy of expansion and, naturally, again contend with America. Moreover—and this is the thesis of Nixon's opponent, Kissinger: Why merely help Russia and not the other former republics, which might thus be in a better position to resist being annexed again? Besides, U.S. dollars can be invested more productively in Eastern Europe, where there is anyway a threat of a new power vacuum between Russia and Germany.

Kissinger, a supporter of the equal-balance theory, cites examples from history that show that the major power, Russia, hardly ever lived in peace with its neighbors. Maybe that is attaching too much importance to history, but the fact is that the end of the Russian empire called the "Soviet Union" has by no means sounded the knell for the end of history. Here are two examples to prove it: In the area of strategic disarmament, talks between Moscow and Washington got stuck at exactly the same point where the two sides have been entrenched for 20 years. Both sides are poised to halve the number of warheads (to 4,700 on each side), but the Russians should first dismantle their monstrous land-based missiles and rely on their submarine-based systems (which is also where America's main weight in potential for deterrence lies).

These are the age-old conflicts between land and sea power, which survived the Romanov and the Red czars. Second example: At exactly the same time it became public that Moscow wants to sell missile technology to its traditional ally, India—against strong resistance from Washington. Even the old rivalry for Delhi has obviously survived the cold war—as has the Russian-Soviet desire to preserve India as a bulwark against China.

In other words, as long as Russia remains a potential superpower because of its enormous arms arsenals, and as long as Yeltsin has to take care that the nationalist camp does not nag him for permanently going down on his knees before America, harmony between the number one and the quasi-number two will not come automatically. Whether Russia completes the path toward democracy and the market economy will probably play a less important role than the question of life and death: Now as then, the two are the only powers that are able to destroy one another.

This is why ambivalence will persist, the poles of which are currently marked by Nixon and Kissinger—with Bush taking a middle position. Maybe a disarmament agreement will be signed on Tuesday or Wednesday; maybe Congress will soon approve the billions in aid to Russia—particularly with a view to the upcoming world economic summit in Munich in early July. What is certain is that the domestic U.S. debate on the new friend (and old foe) will continue. And the old game, which Nixon and Kissinger started with the USSR in 1972—cooperation, wherever possible, and resistance, wherever necessary—will not disappear from the international stage either. Europe, Japan, and China—the superpowers in the waiting room—certainly need not fear that the two former cold warriors will join forces in a lasting alliance against them.

Foreign Minister Views Military Issues

On Conventional Forces Cut

*LD3006123592 Berlin ADN in German 1145 GMT
30 Jun 92*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has seen a breakthrough in the Vienna negotiations on troop levels for conventional forces in Europe. With the acceptance of the draft version of the concluding act in Vienna on Tuesday, "we have taken a large step closer toward an agreement on troop levels for conventional forces," Kinkel said. The agreement, which prevents the "wild" growth of armed forces and makes existing armed forces levels largely open, is to be signed at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on 9 July. It will at the same time commit the participating states to an annual exchange of information, which would reveal precise figures on troop strength in individual units.

The negotiations, which have now led to the draft being ready for signing, began at the CSCE summit in November 1990 in Paris. The armed forces agreement supplements the treaty on conventional forces in Europe signed at the Paris meeting, which set upper limits for five types of heavy conventional weapons.

Urge Chemical Weapons Ban

*AU2606150092 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
26 Jun 92 p 7*

[Text] FRG Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Free Democratic Party of Germany) sees a worldwide ban on chemical weapons "just around the corner." Therefore, he emphatically appealed to the Geneva disarmament conference to make good use of this opportunity by the end of this year. The draft convention, which has been worked out by Germany, is a balanced compromise and fulfills the demands which must be made in a worldwide and credibly verifiable chemical weapons convention. For the first time a treaty is being drawn up that might abolish an entire category of weapons from all over the world: "We must not miss the chance to free the world from this scourge forever."

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary Announces Nuclear Weapons Cut

*LD1506165492 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1615 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION lobby correspondent James Hardy]

[Text] Nuclear weapons carried by Royal Navy ships and aircraft are to be scrapped, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced today. He said nuclear depth charges—a variant of the RAF's [Royal Air Force] free-fall bomb—will be taken apart at the atomic weapons establishment at Aldermaston or shipped back to the United States for destruction.

All training of Royal Navy personnel in handling and dropping the bombs will also cease. But Mr Rifkind declined to put a figure on the number of so-called sub-strategic bombs involved. The total number of both variants in Britain is believed to be no more than 70.

The decision takes a step further the earlier announcement by the government that the Royal Navy would stop carrying nuclear weapons on its surface fleet in normal circumstances. But ministers remain committed to maintaining the Polaris nuclear submarine fleet and eventually replacing it with Trident. Free-fall nuclear bombs will also still be carried by RAF Tornados.

After announcing the move in a Commons written reply, Mr Rifkind told a news briefing at the Ministry of Defence: "The judgment has been reached that this particular capacity in the changed circumstances we now face does not add in any significant way to our security. Therefore it is safe to dispose of it in the knowledge that it will not reduce the security of our national interest."

The government was determined to see the country properly defended, but believed the remaining balance of conventional forces, Trident and the RAF's nuclear capability would fulfil that aim.

The announcement also reflects widespread concern at the effectiveness of the nuclear depth bombs. Many critics believe dropping the bombs from Sea Harrier jump jets and Sea King helicopters and Nimrod aircraft could allow enemy submarines to evade attack. Such is the disturbance created by the initial explosion that any

submarine which avoids destruction could lie low, undetectable by sonar for several days, before quietly slipping away.

The decision to scrap the weapons will remove potentially embarrassing disputes with a number of countries, including New Zealand and Japan, which ban ships carrying nuclear weapons from entering their ports. It comes at a time when Royal Navy vessels are deployed on exercise in the Pacific. Defence sources said there would be no verification of destruction of the weapons as the move was additional to Britain's commitment to cut its sub-strategic forces by 50 percent and not part of any international treaty.

Labour defence spokesman Martin O'Neill said Mr Rifkind's announcement was welcome but long overdue. "The government should now tell us how they will be destroyed and whether there will be international scrutiny of their destruction. We must consider the example we are setting to other countries which are also contemplating the destruction of their nuclear arsenals. The government should come forward with a clear statement about remaining nuclear weapons and in particular Trident."

Rifkind: World Nuclear Disarmament 'Unrealistic'

*LD1706090192 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0844 GMT 17 Jun 92*

[Text] Huge arms cuts announced in the Bush-Yeltsin US summit were welcomed today by Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. "It is enormously heartening that we are seeing throughout the world a genuine process of disarmament done on a basis that actually helps and protects security because it is being done multilaterally and not unilaterally," he said.

The United States and Russia agreed yesterday to slash long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds. President Bush said the pact he and President Yeltsin will sign today would further reduce the chance of a "nuclear nightmare." But Mr Rifkind said on BBC Radio 4's Today programme that suggestions of worldwide nuclear disarmament were unrealistic and the world would remain nuclear over the next 10 years. "If other countries, including some countries with very unstable governments, might be surreptitiously acquiring some crude nuclear weapons, obviously that is a problem the developed world, the western world, also has to be conscious of," he said.

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